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The Electric Grid at a Crossroads: 
A Regional Approach to Siting 
Transmission Lines 
Alexandra B. Klass∗ 
The current regulatory framework for approving long-distance, interstate 
electric transmission lines does not match the physical aspects of the 
interstate electric grid, regional electricity markets, or the growing but 
dispersed renewable energy sources increasingly used to power the grid. 
Despite the interstate nature of the electric grid and electricity markets, the 
states have virtually complete authority over the siting and permitting of 
interstate transmission lines. Continuing state authority over the 
development of the interstate transmission grid is puzzling when compared 
to the nation’s network of interstate natural gas pipelines, for which 
regulatory authority was transferred to the federal government in the 1940s. 
The question for this Article is whether the history surrounding the 
transfer of regulatory authority over interstate natural gas pipelines can 
be instructive in planning for the future of the electric grid. This Article 
shows that that there was a moment in time in the 1940s when natural 
gas, which for a century had been limited in its commercial use because of 
lack of transportation from well sites to cities, became a critical energy 
resource for the entire nation. At that time, Congress responded by 
creating a federal regulatory process to build the interstate pipeline 
network necessary to transport this resource after state regulatory 
authorities had blocked such pipelines. 
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This Article then suggests that the electric grid is nearing a crossroads 
that justifies a similar shift in regulatory authority over the grid, although 
not necessarily using the same framework Congress created for siting 
interstate natural gas pipelines. Instead, this Article proposes a regional 
model for siting interstate transmission lines rather than the purely 
federal approach used for interstate natural gas pipelines. It sets forth 
various options for regional siting approaches, including interstate 
compacts under the Energy Policy Act of 2005 to create separate, regional 
siting authorities; granting Regional Transmission Organizations 
(“RTOs”) siting authority over interstate transmission lines within their 
footprints; and federal mandates on state public utility commissions and 
courts to consider regional benefits and needs in making siting and 
eminent domain determinations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The current regulatory framework for approving long-distance, 
interstate electric transmission lines does not match the physical 
aspects of the interstate electric grid, regional electricity markets, or 
the growing but dispersed renewable energy resources increasingly 
used to power the grid.1 Despite the interstate nature of the electric 
grid and electricity markets, the states have virtually complete 
authority over the siting and permitting of interstate transmission 
lines.2 Continuing state authority over the development of the 
interstate transmission grid is puzzling when compared to the nation’s 
network of interstate natural gas pipelines, for which regulatory 
authority was transferred to the federal government in the 1940s.3 The 
question for this Article is whether the history surrounding the 
 
 1 See, e.g., BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., CAPITALIZING ON THE EVOLVING POWER SECTOR: 
POLICIES FOR A MODERN AND RELIABLE U.S. ELECTRIC GRID 28-33 (2013) (discussing 
flaws in the existing regulatory regime for siting interstate electric transmission lines); 
MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 77 (2011) (concluding that 
existing electric transmission line siting procedures are a “significant hurdle” to 
necessary transmission system expansion and proposing new processes for planning 
interregional transmission line expansion and cost allocation); Alexandra B. Klass, 
Takings and Transmission, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1079 (2013) (suggesting that states ensure 
their eminent domain laws governing electric transmission lines reflect their policy 
goals for expansion of renewable energy use); Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth J. 
Wilson, Interstate Transmission Challenges for Renewable Energy: A Federalism 
Mismatch, 65 VAND. L. REV. 1801 (2012) (suggesting modifications to state-centered 
electric transmission line siting regimes to recognize the regional and national scope 
of the electric grid); Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Grid Governance: The Role of a National 
Network Coordinator, 35 CARDOZO L. REV. 1993 (2014) [hereinafter Grid Governance] 
(proposing the creation of a federal “network coordinator” to address electric grid 
expansion needs rather than a complete transfer of siting authority from the states to 
the federal government); Jim Rossi, The Trojan Horse of Electric Power Transmission 
Line Siting Authority, 39 ENVTL. L. 1015, 1018-19 (2009) (contending that the problem 
of cost allocation in transmission line expansion is a bigger problem than restrictive 
state siting laws); Joel F. Zipp, Amending the Federal Power Act: A Key Step Toward an 
“Energy Security and Supply Act of 2009” for the New Administration, 21 ELECTRICITY J. 
6 (2008) (proposing federal legislation that would transfer siting and eminent domain 
authority over interstate electric transmission lines from the states to the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission). 
 2 BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 1, at 28-33. 
 3 See Minisink Residents for Envtl. Pres. & Safety v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 101-02 
(D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing federal process for siting and approving interstate natural 
gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1859-61 
(discussing Natural Gas Act and natural gas pipeline siting); Robert R. Nordhaus & 
Emily Pitlick, Carbon Dioxide Pipeline Regulation, 30 ENERGY L.J. 85, 88-89 (2009) 
(providing additional background on the regulatory scheme underlying the Natural 
Gas Act). 
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transfer of regulatory authority over interstate natural gas pipelines 
from the states to the federal government can be instructive regarding 
how to plan for the future of the electric grid. This Article first 
concludes that the history of interstate natural gas pipeline siting 
authority provides a pathway away from state regulation. However, 
this Article also concludes that in the case of interstate electric 
transmission lines, a regional approach rather than a purely federal 
approach is a better match for the physical and market characteristics 
of the grid as well as modern policy preferences regarding future 
electricity resources. 
This Article shows that there was a moment in time in the 1940s 
when natural gas, which for a century had been limited in its 
commercial use because of lack of transportation from well sites to 
cities, became a critical energy resource for the entire nation. At that 
time, Congress responded by creating a federal regulatory process to 
build the interstate pipeline network necessary to transport this 
resource after state regulatory authorities had blocked such pipelines.4 
This Article then suggests that the electric grid is nearing a similar 
crossroads that justifies a similar shift in regulatory authority over the 
grid, although not necessarily using the same framework Congress 
created for siting interstate natural gas pipelines. The circumstances 
that justify such a change in regulatory authority include: (1) the 
physical nature of the grid which long ago grew from local and state-
based origins to a regional, multi-state network that facilitates 
interstate, wholesale electricity market transactions; (2) the growth of 
renewable energy, particularly wind energy which is often located far 
from population centers and can only be transported by interstate 
transmission lines,5 in contrast to fossil fuels which can be transported 
by train, pipeline, truck, or ship throughout the country; (3) the 
growth of Regional Transmission Organizations (“RTOs”) — 
federally-approved nonprofit entities that manage the transmission of 
electricity within multi-state regions in many parts of the country, 
operate wholesale market transactions for electricity, and oversee the 
planning of transmission grid expansions within their footprints; and 
 
 4 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1859-65. See generally Alexandra B. Klass & 
Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA 
L. REV. 947 (2015) (discussing states’ refusal to approve interstate natural gas 
pipelines and Congress’s response). 
 5 While some forms of renewable energy, such as rooftop solar and small-scale 
wind energy can be transported over local distribution lines or a small-scale “micro-
grid,” such distributed renewable energy resources currently make up only a small 
portion of total renewable energy use. 
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(4) developing state and federal clean energy policies such as state 
renewable portfolio standards and the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (“EPA’s”) 2014 proposed greenhouse gas (“GHG”) rule for 
existing power plants,6 which has the potential to fundamentally shift 
the dominant electric energy sources throughout the country in future 
years toward increased renewable energy. 
The purpose of this Article is to show that the physical and market 
factors that created the current regulatory regime have changed in a 
manner that is quite similar to the transition that occurred in the 
natural gas industry many decades ago.7 This review also suggests that 
policymakers should consider a regional approach to transmission line 
siting in addition to a federal approach or the status quo. 
Notably, we often pay little attention to the central role the electric 
grid plays in our lives until it breaks down, at which point modern life 
as we know it comes to a screeching halt. As described in a 2013 U.S. 
House of Representatives Report, the nation’s electric grid is both a 
critical asset and highly vulnerable: 
The U.S. bulk-power system serves more than 300 million 
people and is made up of more than 200,000 miles of 
transmission lines, and more than 1 million megawatts of 
generating capacity, and is valued at over $1 trillion. . . . The 
components of the grid are highly interdependent and, as 
history has shown, a line outage or system failure in one area 
can lead to cascading outages in other areas. For example, on 
August 14, 2003, four sagging high-voltage power lines in 
northern Ohio brushed into trees and shut off. Compounded 
by a computer system error, this shut-down caused a cascade 
 
 6 See Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www2. 
epa.gov/carbon-pollution-standards/clean-power-plan-proposed-rule (last visited Feb. 
26, 2015). 
 7 Issues surrounding the potential means of addressing the inevitable state 
opposition to reducing state regulatory authority over the siting of interstate 
transmission lines, and whether principles of federalism support such a change are 
matters scholars and other experts have explored in earlier work. For a discussion of 
these issues, see, for example, Klass, supra note 1 (arguing that increased federal 
authority over interstate transmission line siting is desirable but is strongly opposed 
by many state regulatory authorities); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1 (discussing 
federalism issues in electric grid development); Ostrow, Grid Governance, supra note 1 
(discussing federalism issues in electric grid development); Rossi, supra note 1, at 
1019 (discussing the historically state-centered approach to regulating electric energy 
transmission); and Zipp, supra note 1, at 6 (proposing legislation that would create a 
federal regulatory scheme to govern electric transmission projects). These issues will 
not be addressed in detail here. 
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of failures that eventually left 50 million people without power 
for two days across the United States and Canada. This event, 
the largest blackout in North American history, cost an 
estimated $6 billion and contributed to at least 11 deaths.8 
The Congressional Research Service has expressed similar concerns 
about the impact of significant weather events, such as Hurricane 
Sandy in 2012, on the nation’s aging electric grid.9 
Despite the interstate nature of the electric grid and its importance to 
interstate commerce and national security, states exercise virtually 
exclusive control over the siting and approval of interstate electric 
transmission lines. By contrast, the federal government, through the 
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”) controls the siting 
and approval of interstate natural gas pipelines. The reasons for this are 
not obvious. Both the electric grid and the interstate natural gas 
pipeline network are massive, interlinked, interstate energy 
transportation networks designed to bring energy resources from 
generation and distribution sites to suppliers and users. But each 
regulatory system arose during different political and economic times 
and in response to different constellations of actors, assumptions 
regarding the scarcity or availability of the energy resource in question, 
the role of federal and state governments in regulating energy 
transportation, and varying concerns over monopoly power. Many of 
these factors with regard to the actors, technologies, resource 
availability, and economic forces that underlie these regulatory regimes 
have changed dramatically in the decades that followed their creation. 
This Article illustrates how the nation’s sources of electricity, the 
nature of the electric grid itself, and federal and state policies for 
powering the grid have changed so significantly in recent years that a 
new regulatory framework for siting interstate transmission lines is 
needed to address these shifts. Today there are federal and state policies 
in place to develop wind, solar, and other renewable electricity 
 
 8 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ELECTRIC GRID VULNERABILITY: INDUSTRY 
RESPONSES REVEAL SECURITY GAPS 4 (2013). 
 9 See RICHARD J. CAMPBELL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42923, ELECTRICAL POWER: 
OVERVIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL ISSUES 8 (2013) (“The recent damage sustained to the 
electrical grid by Hurricane Sandy in New York and New Jersey and difficulty in 
restoring electricity service underscore the age and fragility of the power system, and 
how electricity service might benefit from hardening and modernization of various 
power systems.”). See generally The Switch: America’s Electrical Grid, BURN: AN ENERGY 
JOURNAL (June 17, 2013), http://burnanenergyjournal.com/the-switch-americas-
electrical-grid/ (documenting a series of stories on the electricity grid, how it works, 
the players, and what happens when it breaks down). 
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resources that are located far from population centers in places like 
Wyoming, North Dakota, South Dakota, rural Texas, and the Mojave 
Desert. Unlike fossil fuel resources that can be transported to load 
centers by train, truck, pipeline, or ship, large-scale wind and solar 
energy can, for now, only be transported through transmission lines. 
With today’s national and regional electric grid, it no longer makes 
sense for states to be wholly responsible for reviewing and approving 
long-distance, interstate transmission lines. This Article then concludes 
that while a centralized, federal framework could address this issue, a 
regional approach for siting interstate electric transmission lines may be 
a better match for today’s regional electricity grids, markets, and 
resources. A regional approach for siting interstate transmission lines is 
possible if states entered into interstate compacts under existing federal 
law, if Congress granted RTOs siting authority for interstate 
transmission lines within their footprints, or if Congress required state 
public utility commissions (“PUCs”) and courts to consider regional 
benefits in siting and eminent domain decisions. 
Part I explores the interstate natural gas market and its transportation 
network. Unlike interstate electric transmission lines, siting and 
eminent domain authority for interstate natural gas pipelines were 
transferred from the states to the federal government in the 1940s. 
Thus, this Part examines the factors that led to this major displacement 
of state authority in favor of federal authority in order consider its 
potential application to interstate electric transmission lines. 
Part II turns to the creation of the U.S. electric grid and interstate 
electric transmission markets. It explains how the grid developed from 
a local, central station model to the regional grids that transport 
electricity today. It also summarizes briefly the development of state 
and federal regulation of electricity markets, electric transmission 
networks, and the siting of interstate electric transmission lines. 
Part III details the contours of the modern, regional grid, along with 
the regional electricity markets that federal law, state law, and market 
actors have created. It also highlights the significant changes in recent 
years to the sources of energy used to generate electricity and the 
impact of those changes on the future of the electric grid. Finally, it 
describes current interstate transmission projects designed to 
transport renewable energy, particularly wind energy, in multiple 
regions of the country, as well as the roadblocks many of these 
projects are facing in connection with the state siting process. 
Part IV then proposes that with regard to transmitting electric 
energy, the United States is approaching a crossroads similar to the 
one that existed for natural gas in the 1940s. At that time, cities across 
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the country began to transition away from manufactured gas, which 
could be created within city limits from a variety of energy sources 
such as coal and oil, to relying more heavily on natural gas, which 
required interstate pipelines to transport the gas from distant well sites 
to population centers. A similar transition is now occurring with 
regard to renewable electric energy resources, but the fact of this 
transition has been somewhat masked because we still have ample 
non-renewable energy resources to rely upon for electricity. Using 
coal, natural gas, or uranium to generate electricity has historically 
allowed for multiple means of transporting the energy resources 
themselves: coal and uranium can be transported by truck and train to 
power plants near population centers and natural gas can be 
transported by pipeline to the same destinations. Renewable energy, 
by contrast, can only be transported through transmission lines and, 
like natural gas, renewable energy, particularly wind energy, is a 
locally-constrained resource that is often most abundant far from 
population centers. 
This Part then suggests that a regional approach to siting interstate 
electric transmission lines may be preferable to the purely federal 
approach used for interstate national gas pipelines. This is because a 
regional approach to siting interstate transmission lines better matches 
the physical dimensions of the electric grid, existing electricity 
markets, and current electric transmission needs. There are at least 
three models for siting interstate transmission lines on a regional level. 
First, states could enter into interstate compacts under the Energy 
Policy Act of 2005 to create regional siting agencies with permitting 
authority over interstate transmission lines within those states.10 
Second, Congress could transfer siting authority to RTOs in areas 
where RTOs exist. Although RTOs are non-governmental 
organizations and are thus not traditional siting authorities, there is 
precedent both within and outside of the electricity realm for granting 
siting authority with federal oversight to such entities where 
appropriate. Third, Congress could leave siting authority with the 
states but require state PUCs and state courts to expressly consider 
regional transmission needs and regional energy needs in making 
siting and eminent domain decisions. 
In suggesting a regional approach to interstate transmission line 
siting, this Article recognizes that state interests in protecting their 
own regulatory authority, as well as the politics of today’s Congress, 
make it difficult to envision implementing such an approach in the 
 
 10 Energy Policy Act of 2005, 16 U.S.C. § 824p(i) (2012); see infra Part IV.A. 
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near future. Nevertheless, a major regional or national disruption, like 
the natural gas shortages on the East Coast in the 1940s, or the 2003 
blackouts, which led to the creation of new regulatory bodies to 
govern the grid, can change political sentiment very quickly.11 When 
that day arrives, it will be important to consider a regional approach to 
interstate transmission line siting that matches today’s regional grid 
and regional electricity resources in additional to a federal approach or 
the status quo. Indeed, what may seem like a radical approach today 
may appear inevitable in the future. 
I. THE NATURAL GAS TRANSPORTATION NETWORK: HISTORY AND 
REGULATION 
This Part provides a history of the natural gas transportation 
network with a focus on how the industry’s development influenced 
the regulation of the network of interstate pipelines that transports 
natural gas across the country.12 It explains how and why Congress 
transferred siting and eminent domain authority for interstate natural 
gas pipelines to the federal government in the early part of the 
twentieth century. In doing so, this Part provides an example of 
Congress shifting jurisdiction over siting and eminent domain 
authority for a major U.S. energy transportation network away from 
the states in order to meet national energy transportation goals. This 
example is instructive in considering the potential for similar shifts in 
siting electric transmission lines discussed in Parts II–IV. 
Natural gas seeps have been observed since ancient times.13 In the 
early 1800s people knew natural gas springs could produce heat and 
light, but transportation technology at the time did not permit 
capturing or transporting the gas long distances for use elsewhere.14 
As a result, throughout the 1800s and into the mid-1900s, cities relied 
on manufactured gas, or “town gas” for lighting, cooking, and 
heating.15 Manufactured gas is similar in chemical composition to 
 
 11 See infra notes 40–44 and accompanying text (discussing events leading up to 
enactment of the Natural Gas Act); infra notes 126–28 and accompanying text 
(discussing the legislative response to the 2003 Northeast blackouts). 
 12 For a more detailed discussion of the history and regulation of the interstate 
natural gas pipeline network, see Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 4, at 989-1009. 
 13 See History, NATURALGAS.ORG (Sept. 20, 2013), http://naturalgas.org/overview/ 
history/. 
 14 See CHRISTOPHER J. CASTANEDA, INVISIBLE FUEL: MANUFACTURED AND NATURAL GAS 
IN AMERICA, 1800–2000, at 38 (1999); ARLON R. TUSSING & CONNIE C. BARLOW, THE 
NATURAL GAS INDUSTRY: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, AND ECONOMICS 9-10 (1984). 
 15 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 4. 
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natural gas but has the benefit of being able to be made at any location 
from coal, oil, wood, or other cheap organic material.16 
Major natural gas wells were discovered in Ohio in the 1840s but 
lack of transportation options limited commercial development.17 By 
the 1850s only industries and towns located very close to wells could 
make use of natural gas.18 Although associated natural gas was 
discovered with oil in the first U.S. oil boom in Titusville, 
Pennsylvania in the late 1850s, the gas was simply a nuisance to oil 
drillers as it caused well blowouts and fires and could not be captured 
and put to economic use.19 As a result, when drillers found natural gas 
deposits without accompanying oil they were usually abandoned.20 
It was not until 1872 that the first miles of iron pipe were 
constructed to create the first natural gas transportation in the 
Pennsylvania Oil Region for the “waste gas” found with the oil.21 
Pittsburgh was the first major city in the United States to use natural 
gas for industrial purposes on a large scale, made possible by discovery 
of gas wells in close proximity to the city in the early 1870s.22 In the 
1880s, natural gas companies began forming and developing more gas 
fields in Pennsylvania, transporting gas to households in nearby 
municipalities and to local glass and steel plants.23 Pittsburgh had 
historically used tremendous amounts of coal to fuel its iron industry 
and the city’s air quality was poor.24 In the 1880s, the New York Times 
reported that Pittsburgh’s adoption of natural gas would improve its 
air quality.25 Overall, natural gas offered many benefits over 
manufactured gas throughout the country, namely, twice as much 
energy (“Btu”) per unit of volume, no poisonous carbon monoxide, 
 
 16 See id.; Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from 
Wellhead to Burnertip, 25 ENERGY L.J. 57, 60 (2004) (originally published in 9 ENERGY 
L.J. 1 (1988)). 
 17 The same challenge exists today in North Dakota, which is producing massive 
amounts of natural gas from oil wells, but instead of capturing and making 
commercial use of the gas, oil well operators are flaring quantities of natural gas worth 
$100 million per month into the atmosphere because of the lack of sufficient natural 
gas pipeline infrastructure. See Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 4, at 1009-15 
(discussing natural gas flaring practices by North Dakota oil well drillers). 
 18 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 42. 
 19 See id.; TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 9. 
 20 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 42-43. 
 21 See id. at 43-44; TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 9. 
 22 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 44-45. 
 23 See id. at 45. 
 24 See id. at 44. 
 25 See id. 
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and elimination of the soot and sulphur compounds that were emitted 
from manufactured gas works.26 
Local availability of lower cost natural gas, with its higher Btu 
content, encouraged industry to begin using natural gas to 
manufacture iron, steel, chemical products, and glass on a more 
widespread basis.27 By 1885, 150 companies were chartered to sell gas 
in Pennsylvania and further gas discoveries in Ohio and West Virginia 
enabled cities in that region to begin using natural gas from nearby 
wells.28 Indiana gas fields were discovered in the late 1800s, which 
increased both demand for and production of natural gas resources.29 
While these eastern gas fields were soon depleted, drillers discovered 
new gas fields in Oklahoma and Kansas which followed the same 
boom and bust pattern. From 1880 to 1910, the use and 
transportation of natural gas expanded nationwide, leading to new 
natural gas pipeline networks and markets. 
In the late 1890s Standard Oil formed the East Ohio Gas Company 
to produce and deliver gas to customers in Ohio, and Hope Natural 
Gas Company acquired gas wells in West Virginia.30 The public was 
becoming increasingly dependent on natural gas during this period 
and so states created their own regulatory commissions to regulate 
intrastate gas pipelines and their rates.31 In 1918, drillers discovered 
the huge Panhandle Field in northern Texas, and in 1922, new sources 
of gas were found in the Mid-Continent Field near the borders of 
Kansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.32 Between 1927 and 1931, about twelve 
major gas transportation systems developed, all over 200 miles long.33 
By the late 1920s, four public utility holding companies dominated 
the gas industry, operating as a powerful cartel often referred to as the 
“Power Trust.”34 During the Depression, shortages and high gas prices, 
monopoly power, and a reliance on manufactured gas characterized 
the eastern United States while in Texas, Kansas, Oklahoma, and 
Louisiana, an oversupply of natural gas remained unconnected to 
 
 26 See TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 28. 
 27 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 49. 
 28 See id. at 50. 
 29 See id. at 51. 
 30 See id. at 71. 
 31 See The History of Regulation, NATURALGAS.ORG (Sept. 20, 2013), http://naturalgas. 
org/regulation/history/. 
 32 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 84. 
 33 See TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 33. 
 34 CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 89-90. 
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markets.35 Pressure for greater gas industry regulation grew. Congress 
directed the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to study and report 
on allegations of discrimination and exercise of monopoly power in 
the natural gas industry. The FTC report showed that the four holding 
companies controlled more than 60% of all natural gas produced in 
1934 as well as 58% of U.S. pipelines.36 The FTC found that 40% of 
gas used in the United States was shipped in interstate commerce and 
seven million end users consumed it for various purposes in thirty-
four states.37 
The FTC’s report resulted in several pieces of legislation, including 
the Natural Gas Act of 1938, which gave the Federal Power 
Commission (“FPC”) authority to regulate sales of natural gas for 
resale in interstate commerce, transportation of natural in interstate 
commerce, and facilities used for such sales and transportation.38 The 
Natural Gas Act created a process where a proposed interstate natural 
gas pipeline could obtain a Certificate of Public Convenience and 
Necessity from the FPC — now FERC — after a review of the 
economic and environmental impacts of the pipeline.39 
After World War II, major northeast cities shifted quickly from 
manufactured gas to natural gas when southwestern natural gas 
arrived via long-distance pipelines.40 But the existing pipelines could 
not meet the growing demand and state governments, the coal 
industry (a source of manufactured gas), and railroad interests 
blocked efforts to construct new pipelines in Pennsylvania.41 
Landowners in other states also blocked pipeline efforts. Natural gas 
shortages during the winter of 1946–1947 resulted in nearly 50,000 
workers being laid off from jobs, and raised alarms in Congress.42 
 
 35 See id. at 103-04 (noting that many pipelines carried less than 50% of their 
capacity because of low demand or lack of reliable supplies while in Texas trillions of 
cubic feet of natural gas were vented as drillers were only interested in the oil from the 
wells and not the associated gas); M. ELIZABETH SANDERS, THE REGULATION OF NATURAL 
GAS: POLICY AND POLITICS, 1938–1978, at 24 (1981). 
 36 CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 107. 
 37 Id. 
 38 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 717c (2012) (stating pipeline rates must be just, 
reasonable, and not unduly discriminatory and subject to federal agency oversight). 
 39 See 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c)–(h) (2012); Minisink Residents for Env’t Pres. & Safety 
v. FERC, 762 F.3d 97, 101-02 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (describing federal process for siting 
and approving interstate natural gas pipelines under the Natural Gas Act); Klass & 
Wilson, supra note 1, at 1859-60. 
 40 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 132. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Amendments to the Natural Gas Act: Hearings on H.R. 2185, H.R. 2235, H.R. 2292, 
H.R. 2569, and H.R. 2956 Before the H. Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 80th 
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During subsequent debates, House members heard testimony 
regarding the workers laid off during gas shortages, the rapid 
depletion of gas storage fields during the winter, and the industries 
that could not meet production commitments.43 In 1947, Congress 
enacted new legislation granting federal eminent domain authority to 
any interstate natural gas pipeline holding a certificate of public 
convenience and necessity under the Natural Gas Act.44 
In 1948, Philadelphia became the first major eastern city to convert 
from manufactured gas to natural gas and receive gas by long-distance 
pipelines from the southwest.45 Between 1950 and 1956, five pipelines 
of 1,000 miles or more were built from the Gulf Coast to northern and 
eastern markets.46 As the Panhandle and Mid-Continent Fields 
continued producing natural gas, pipeline companies tripled and 
quadrupled their capacity by the 1980s.47 While Congress and FERC 
have experimented over the years with more and less regulation of the 
natural gas industry, federal permitting and eminent domain authority 
over interstate natural gas pipelines has remained constant. 
Until recently, natural gas was used primarily for heating rather 
than electricity because of its high price as compared to coal and other 
baseload electricity resources.48 The shale gas revolution that begin in 
approximately 2007, however, has caused gas prices to fall 
significantly in the United States, allowing natural gas to replace coal 
as a source of baseload electricity in many parts of the country.49 
There are significant air emission benefits associated with burning 
natural gas for electricity as opposed to coal in the form of significant 
 
Cong. 46 (1947) (statement of Simeon Willis, Governor of Kentucky) [hereinafter 
Amendments to the Natural Gas Act Hearings]. Committee members heard testimony 
regarding the approximately 49,000 workers laid off during gas shortages, id. at 620 
(statement of James W. Haley, Attorney, National Coal Association), the rapid 
depletion of gas storage fields during winter, id. at 186 (statement of John Siggins, Jr., 
Chairman, Pennsylvania PUC), and the industries that could not produce or purchase 
necessary materials, including a pipeline company that could not expand its capacity 
because it had reduced its gas deliveries to the company that manufactured the needed 
pipe, id. at 183-84. 
 43 See id. at 183-84, 186 (Statement of John Siggins, Jr., Chairman, Pennsylvania 
PUC); id. at 188 (statement of William A. Daugherty, Attorney); id. at 620 (statement 
of James W. Haley, Attorney, National Coal Association). 
 44 CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 139; see Natural Gas Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 
80-245, 61 Stat. 459 (1947). 
 45 See CASTANEDA, supra note 14, at 139-40. 
 46 See TUSSING & BARLOW, supra note 14, at 46. 
 47 See id. 
 48 LINCOLN DAVIES ET AL., ENERGY LAW AND POLICY 125-27 (West Acad. Publ’g 2015). 
 49 See infra Part III.B (discussing energy sources used for electricity). 
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reduced emissions of pollutants such as mercury, SO2 and CO2.50 
Nevertheless, many energy policy experts remain concerned about the 
nation becoming too dependent on natural gas for electricity 
generation because of GHG emissions associated with the hydraulic 
fracturing process itself and adverse impacts of natural gas use on 
continued renewable energy development.51 
There are currently about 2.6 million miles of interstate and 
intrastate natural gas pipelines in the United States.52 These include 
almost 200,000 miles of gathering pipelines in the country; these lines 
collect gas from production areas and transport it to processing 
facilities where it is then sent to transmission pipelines after the 
refining process.53 As of 2007, interstate pipelines carried 81% of the 
natural gas in the United States to local distribution companies for 
retail sale to customers.54 A majority of the country’s gas thus flows in 
pipelines subject to FERC’s regulation regarding construction, rates, 
and terms of service. 
Between 2000 and 2011, pipeline companies applied for and 
received FERC approval for more than 16,000 miles of interstate gas 
pipelines, 14,600 miles of which had been constructed and put in 
service by 2011.55 In order to expedite the permitting process, the 
Energy Policy Act of 2005 (“EPAct 2005”) created an optional pre-
filing procedure and made FERC the lead agency responsible for 
coordinating federal agency authorizations and compliance with the 
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) during pipeline 
certificate application reviews.56 An Executive Order was also issued in 
 
 50 See, e.g., DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 126-27 (describing environmental 
benefits and costs of electricity produced by natural gas); Press Release, Nat’l Oceanic 
& Atmospheric Admin., New Study: U.S. Power Plant Emissions Down (Jan. 9, 2014), 
available at http://www.esrl.noaa.gov/csd/news/2014/148_0109.html (reporting on 
new study showing shift from coal-fired power to natural gas-fired power for 
electricity has resulted in a reduction of pollution associated with power plants). 
 51 See, e.g., Matthew L. Wald, The Potential Downside of Natural Gas, N.Y. TIMES, 
June 3, 2014, at B3 (presenting problems associated with increased use of natural gas 
for generating electricity). 
 52 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-221, PIPELINE PERMITTING: 
INTERSTATE AND INTRASTATE NATURAL GAS PERMITTING PROCESSES INCLUDE MULTIPLE 
STEPS, AND TIME FRAMES VARY 4 (2013). 
 53 See id. 
 54 See CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY SOLUTIONS, U.S. NATURAL GAS INFRASTRUCTURE 3 
(2012).  
 55 INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS ASS’N OF AM. FOUND., NORTH AMERICAN NATURAL GAS 
MIDSTREAM INFRASTRUCTURE THROUGH 2035: A SECURE ENERGY FUTURE 8-9 (2011). 
 56 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 15 U.S.C. § 717n (2012); PAUL W. PARFOMAK, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43138, INTERSTATE NATURAL GAS PIPELINES: PROCESS AND 
  
2015] The Electric Grid at a Crossroads 1909 
2012 to “institutionalize best practices and reduce the amount of time 
required to make permitting and review decisions for infrastructure 
projects, including pipelines.”57 A 2013 Congressional Research 
Service report noted that federal and state agencies have attempted to 
be responsive to the shale gas boom, and that twice as much 
transmission capacity was added to the U.S. pipeline network in 2008 
as in 2007.58 The same report cited statistics showing that most 
interstate natural gas pipelines can move from the pre-filing stage to 
certificate within twelve months.59 
II. THE ELECTRICITY TRANSPORTATION NETWORK: HISTORY, 
REGULATION, AND CURRENT CHALLENGES 
This Part turns from the natural gas transportation network to the 
electricity transportation network. It begins with Thomas Edison and 
the construction of the first transmission lines. It then describes the 
development of the early electric grids and electric utilities, state and 
federal electricity regulation, and the regulatory regime governing the 
siting and approval of interstate transmission lines. Thus, this Part sets 
the stage for Part III, which explores the new demands placed on the 
grid by policies encouraging the use of renewable energy as well as the 
new regional grid actors, such as RTOs, that have fundamentally 
transformed grid planning, management, and operation in many parts 
of the country. 
A. The First Electric Grids and the Rise of Electric Utilities 
In the United States, Thomas Edison started working on the 
incandescent bulb in 1877, joining a group of inventors already 
developing a power supply that would be economical and steady.60 
Edison ultimately succeeded in creating a lighting system that would 
operate in a central station, sending electricity through wires and 
switches to incandescent bulbs.61 After a period of testing and 
 
TIMING OF FERC PERMIT APPLICATION REVIEW 2 (2015).  
 57 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 52, at 30 (citing Exec. Order No. 
13604, 77 C.F.R. 18887 (2012)). 
 58 See PARFOMAK, supra note 56, at 8 & fig.2. 
 59 See PARFOMAK, supra note 56, at 7-9. For a discussion of some of the safety 
issues associated with the build-out of oil and gas pipelines as a result of the shale oil 
and gas “revolution,” see Klass & Meinhardt, supra note 4. 
 60 See ERNEST FREEBERG, THE AGE OF EDISON: ELECTRIC LIGHT AND THE INVENTION OF 
MODERN AMERICA 29 (2013). 
 61 See id. at 43. 
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formulation, Edison identified 1,500 potential future customers who 
were burning coal-gas in about 20,000 lamps, mapped out routes for 
ditches and switches,62 and carefully studied the existing gas 
infrastructure, as he planned to use abandoned gas pipelines to carry 
electrical wires to homes and replace gaslights with electric fixtures.63 
In 1879, San Francisco became the first city in the world to install a 
centralized electric generating station to distribute electricity to power 
arc lamps at different points in the city,64 and in 1880, New York lit 
almost a mile of Broadway with twenty-three lights.65 Electric 
companies usually installed a town’s entire street lighting system at 
their own expense in order to enter into potentially lucrative 
municipal contracts.66 
The introduction of single-phase alternating current (“AC”) and 
transformers in the late 1880s would change the movement of 
electricity and the extent of electric utility service.67 George 
Westinghouse, the famous industrialist who drilled for natural gas in 
his Pittsburgh backyard, collaborated with other inventors and built 
on earlier developments to create the modern transformer.68 The 
transformer allowed voltage to be increased (“stepped up”) as it left 
the generator, and to be decreased (“stepped down”) to low voltage at 
the end of a long transmission line.69 Westinghouse recognized that 
with AC, he might ship electricity over long distances to factories and 
homes. In this way, power could be used for many purposes beyond 
than incandescent lighting70 and generating stations with their 
accompanying smoke and noise could be located closer to fuel 
sources71 and further from customers.72 
Direct current (“DC”) had been Edison’s preferred method of 
transmitting electricity, but DC had significant limitations.73 After his 
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 66 See id. at 61. 
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initial success with AC, Westinghouse strung three miles of wire 
between Pittsburgh and East Liberty to test the system.74 The 
company’s first customer was a Buffalo, New York department store.75 
Twenty-seven new customers in various locations placed orders for 
service soon after that,76 and after one year in business, Westinghouse 
Electric Company had sixty-eight AC central stations under contract 
or completed.77 Developments such as the commercial introduction of 
competitive AC motors made it increasingly apparent that AC was 
more than a temporary threat to DC, and Edison Electric Company 
ultimately merged with a successful AC firm to become the General 
Electric Company in 1892.78 The period between 1893 and 1903 
witnessed increasing use of AC, which allowed transmission distances 
to jump from two miles to over 100 miles.79 In 1896 Westinghouse 
transmitted 11,000 volts from the new hydroelectric generating plant 
at Niagara Falls to Buffalo, New York across a line spanning twenty-
two miles.80 Long-distance hydroelectric power transmission began in 
California in the 1890s.81 
The introduction of AC and long-distance transmission encouraged 
the consolidation of electric utilities.82 In Philadelphia in 1895, there 
were more than twenty electric companies operating technologically 
incompatible systems that used varying voltage and AC at different 
frequencies.83 By 1902, the Philadelphia Electric Company had 
consolidated all of the city’s neighborhood companies into one 
utility.84 Companies that consolidated prospered from “increased 
reliability, economies of scale, fuel cost differentials and [ability to 
 
from generators and transmitted over longer distances (which was possible because of 
the higher voltage) and then transferred into a series of batteries. After the batteries 
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 79 MUCHOW & MOGEL, supra note 64, § 81.01[1]. 
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manage] peak loads.”85 In 1905, California Gas & Electric 
incorporated as Pacific Gas & Electric, and by 1906 had grown 
through a series of mergers and acquisitions to include ten 
hydroelectric plants, interconnecting transmission lines, two long-
distance transmission lines to the San Francisco Bay area, and gas and 
electric utilities that distributed power to customers in cities including 
San Jose, Oakland, Berkeley, and San Francisco.86 Between 1882 and 
1905, Chicago had granted electric companies twenty-nine charters 
for nonexclusive franchises, and outlying towns granted eighteen 
charters during the same years, hoping to spur competition and lower 
service costs.87 Samuel Insull — the man credited with “founding the 
business of centralized electric supply” — saw the potential in 
combining AC and steam turbines to produce massive quantities of 
power,88 but he would need a large and varied customer base to make 
it profitable. Insull instructed General Electric to build a 5,000-
kilowatt turbine — a huge generating capacity for the time — and 
installed it in 1903 at the Chicago Edison Company where Insull was 
president.89 He bought out competitors, merged their equipment with 
his own, and promoted electricity consumption at different times of 
the day to produce cheaper electricity (which further attracted 
customers), enlarging to become Commonwealth Edison.90 As other 
electric companies followed Insull’s approach in the early decades of 
the 1900s, cities like New York and Detroit were eventually served by 
monopolies rather than competitive power markets.91 
By the 1890s, towns were building their own waterworks, and many 
thought they should be the entity to provide electricity to their 
citizens as well.92 Public officials began comparing lighting bills and 
were angry to find that customers were paying dramatically different 
prices.93 City governments sometimes engaged in “municipalization,” 
where they purchased the assets of utility companies and operated 
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them, or built their own utility service and forced private utilities to 
sell.94 In some places it worked: the mayoral candidate of Detroit ran 
on the issue in 1889, won, and established municipal ownership of the 
power plant and streetlight network in 1895.95 The annual cost to run 
each streetlight went from $132 to $87 in 1898.96 Municipal 
ownership became a popular idea,97 gaining strength so that by the 
1912 presidential election, public ownership of electric utilities was an 
issue of importance to voters.98 Between 1910 and 1920, some 
Midwestern cities’ voters opted to make their electric utility companies 
municipally owned and operated.99 But even at the apex of this 
movement, municipalities did not run the majority of electric 
utilities.100 The threat that a local government might take over electric 
service did cause private utilities to become more amenable to 
regulation, as a better alternative to losing the market altogether.101 
B. State and Federal Regulation of Public Utilities and Grid Expansion 
During the 1920s, vertically integrated public utilities constructed 
intrastate and interstate transmission lines to serve customers in their 
in-state territories. As a consequence of the growing efficiencies in the 
electric industry from 1900 to the 1930s, small public and private 
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power companies merged with, purchased power from, or were 
acquired by larger private utility companies.102 By the late 1920s, the 
sixteen largest electric power private holding companies, which often 
owned a number of electric utilities in various jurisdictions, controlled 
more than 75% of all U.S. generation.103 States’ PUCs began to regulate 
utility rates in exchange for grants to utilities of exclusive service 
territories. In this way, states, generally with the support of the 
utilities they regulated, created the rate-regulated, natural monopoly 
framework in electricity that continues to exist in most states today.104 
Also in the 1920s, utilities continued to seek economies of scale and 
worked together to integrate their systems by constructing interstate 
transmission lines and creating the start of the regional grids that exist 
today. When states attempted to regulate those interstate electricity 
sales, the Supreme Court held that such regulation violated the 
dormant Commerce Clause, creating a regulatory gap known as the 
“Attleboro gap” after the primary Supreme Court decision restricting 
state regulation.105 In 1935, Congress filled that gap by enacting the 
Federal Power Act (“FPA”) granting FERC’s predecessor, the Federal 
Power Commission (“FPC”), exclusive authority to regulate the 
transmission of electricity in interstate commerce and the wholesale 
sale of electricity in interstate commerce.106 The law left the regulation 
of retail electricity transactions to the states as well as the siting of 
interstate and intrastate transmission lines.107 
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The FPC and FERC used their Congressional authority over 
wholesale electricity sales and transmission of electricity in interstate 
commerce to issue a series of orders to ensure reasonable rates and 
non-discrimination in wholesale electricity markets and transmission 
access.108 Congress provided additional authority to FERC to pursue 
these goals in the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978 
(“PURPA”), which allowed independent electricity producers with 
“qualifying” facilities access to the power grid and to make electricity 
sales.109 Then, in the Energy Policy Act of 1992, Congress authorized 
FERC to require utilities to provide access to transmission services on 
an open and non-discriminatory basis and to encourage transmission 
planning by RTOs, states, and utilities.110 
Today, RTOs and Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) manage the 
grid and regional markets for wholesale power in many, but not all, 
states.111 In the regions where RTOs and ISOs have formed, those entities 
engage in regional grid planning, working with public utilities, states, and 
other grid participants. Despite the move to regional grid planning in 
parts of the country where RTOs exist, Congress has left the actual 
permitting, siting, and eminent domain authority for interstate 
transmission lines with the states, subject to a few exceptions detailed 
below. In many ways, this is not surprising. Electricity began as a 
localized resource and, unlike natural gas, which has always required 
interstate pipelines to transport the energy resource to customers, 
traditional electricity resources such as coal, natural gas, and uranium did 
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not need transmission lines for long-distance transportation.112 Instead, 
utilities could transport these energy resources by train, truck, or pipeline 
to local or regional power plants, which could then convert these energy 
resources into electricity, and deliver that electricity to customers on local 
transmission lines. But as states and utilities attempt to increase the 
percentages of renewable energy in their electricity mix, the grid begins to 
resemble the interstate natural gas pipeline network prior to the 1940s, 
with all its state-based limitations, before Congress transferred siting and 
eminent domain authority to the federal government. 
C. State Siting and Eminent Domain Authority for Transmission Lines 
As noted above, although FERC has jurisdiction over wholesale 
power sales in interstate commerce and transmission of electricity in 
interstate commerce, states retain jurisdiction over retail electricity 
sales and the siting, approval, and grant of eminent domain authority 
for virtually all transmission lines, including interstate transmission 
lines.113 This stands in contrast to the regulatory structure for 
interstate natural gas pipelines.114 As a result, a utility or other 
transmission operator that wishes to build an interstate transmission 
line must obtain siting permission and eminent domain authority from 
all of the states in the line’s path, usually through the state PUCs, and 
follow each state’s permitting process and standards.115 In some states, 
transmission operators must also obtain approval from counties and 
other local governmental entities before constructing a line.116 The 
transmission siting laws in each state vary, but generally require the 
transmission operator (whether a public utility or a private 
transmission company) to establish the “need” for the line, the effect 
of the line on reliability, alternatives to the proposed line, and the 
potential environmental impacts of the line.117 If successful, the 
transmission operator receives a “Certificate of Need” or a “Certificate 
of Public Convenience and Necessity.”118 
In virtually all states, once a transmission operator receives its 
certificate, it can exercise the power of eminent domain if it fails to 
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reach voluntary agreements with all landowners for the required 
easements.119 Generally, states define transmission lines as a “public 
use,” which allows the use of eminent domain under both the Fifth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution as well as state constitution with 
similar provisions that allow the taking of private property for a public 
use upon payment of just compensation.120 In a few states, public 
utility and/or private transmission operators can exercise eminent 
domain authority without first obtaining a certificate.121 Some states 
allow public utilities, but not private transmission operators, to 
exercise eminent domain authority under the theory that such 
privately built lines are not a “public use.”122 
The problem with individual states determining whether there is a 
“need” for an interstate transmission line or whether the line is a 
public use is that a single state legislature, PUC, or court will 
necessarily focus on the need of the citizens of its own state.123 In most 
states, interstate transmission lines provide regional or national 
benefits that may overshadow any in-state benefits. This is particularly 
true for long-distance transmission lines designed to bring wind 
energy from one state to population centers several states away 
without any on-ramps or off-ramps in between. What is the benefit or 
public use to the states in between who will not see lower electricity 
rates, increased clean energy use in the state, or new markets for their 
own generation resources? While such states may see improved grid 
reliability because the new line will benefit the grid as a whole, that 
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need for comprehensive regional plans that can stretch across state lines and borders). 
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may be little consolation when weighed against the physical impacts to 
private lands, views, and natural resources caused by the line. 
Although state law governs the vast majority of interstate 
transmission line approvals, there are some circumstances where 
federal law rather than state law controls the siting and approval of 
transmission lines. However, such authority is quite limited 
geographically and does little to address the poor “fit” between state 
regulatory siting authority for transmission lines and the regional scale 
of the transmission grid and electricity markets. 
First, the federal government has plenary authority over siting 
transmission lines on federal lands, which make up a significant 
percentage of land in many western states, although only a very small 
percentage of land in the rest of the country.124 The FPA also provides 
limited authority to construct transmissions lines to connect federally 
permitted hydropower facilities to the existing grid.125 
Beyond such projects on federal land or for federal hydropower 
projects, Congress created limited federal siting authority to address 
transmission congestion in section 1221 of the Energy Policy Act of 
2005 (“EPAct 2005”) in response to the 2003 Northeast blackouts.126 
In section 1221 of EPAct 2005, Congress directed the U.S. Department 
of Energy (“DOE”) to conduct transmission congestion studies every 
three years to identify areas of the country experiencing transmission 
constraints or congestion.127 The DOE may formally designate those 
areas as National Interest Electric Transmission Corridors (“NIETCs”) 
and, once an area receives a NIETC designation, FERC may exercise 
“backstop” siting authority if a state declines to approve a line within a 
NIETC.128 However, decisions by the federal courts of appeal have 
significantly limited DOE and FERC’s authority in this area, and the 
statutory provisions have not resulted in a single federal approval of a 
transmission line.129 
 
 124 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1825-27. For a map showing the significant 
variation in percentage of federal lands in the fifty states, see CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, 
FEDERICO CHEEVER & BRET C. BIRDSONG, NATURAL RESOURCES LAW 36 (3d ed. 2013). 
 125 16 U.S.C. § 797(e) (2012) (FERC’s hydropower licensing authority includes 
siting authority over related transmission lines); James J. Hoecker & Douglas W. 
Smith, Regulatory Federalism and Development of Electric Transmission: A Brewing 
Storm?, 35 ENERGY L.J. 71, 82 (2014). 
 126 See DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 461-64. 
 127 Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1816-17. 
 128 Id. at 1816-19 (discussing EPAct 2005). 
 129 See Cal. Wilderness Coal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 631 F.3d 1072, 1107 (9th Cir. 
2011) (invalidating DOE’s NIETCs in the Southwest and Mid-Atlantic regions for 
failure to adequately consult with affected states in making NIETC designations); 
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In one significant decision, Piedmont Environmental Council v. 
FERC,130 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that 
language in EPAct 2005 granting FERC transmission line permitting 
jurisdiction when a state commission has “withheld approval [of a 
permit application] for more than 1 year” did not include situations 
where a state commission had denied a transmission line 
application.131 Instead, the court held that FERC’s authority was 
limited to circumstances where the state commission did not have 
authority to act or acts inappropriately by including “project-killing” 
conditions on the permit.132 
This major limitation on FERC’s ability to site transmission lines in 
areas experiencing congestion prompted a dissent from Judge Traxler, 
who cited the circumstances leading up to EPAct 2005 and some of 
the legislative history that supported a broader reach of FERC siting 
authority.133 He focused first on the shift since the enactment of the 
FPA in the 1930s from electricity being produced, transmitted, and 
consumed in the same general geographic area to today’s long-
distance, interstate transmission grid.134 He then cited a 2002 DOE 
report warning that construction of new transmission lines has been 
unable to keep up with electricity demand, which has created 
bottlenecks that have increased consumer costs and the chances of 
blackouts.135 That report went on to recommend that FERC should be 
authorized to act “if state and regional bodies are unsuccessful in 
siting and permitting national interest transmission lines.”136 Judge 
Traxler also cited to statements by Senate Energy and Natural 
Resource Committee Chairman Domenici that reflected the same 
concerns contained in the 2002 Department of Energy report.137 But 
 
Piedmont Envtl. Council v. FERC, 558 F.3d 304, 313 (4th Cir. 2009), cert. denied, 558 
U.S. 1147 (2010). 
 130 Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d 304. 
 131 Id. at 310, 313-14 (quoting Federal Power Act § 216(b)(1)(C)(i), 16 U.S.C. 
§ 824p (2006)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 132 Id. at 313-14. 
 133 Id. at 320, 325-26 (Traxler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). 
 134 Id. at 320-21. 
 135 Id. at 321. 
 136 Id. (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NATIONAL TRANSMISSION GRID STUDY 58-59 
(2002), available at http://www.ferc.gov/industries/electric/indus-act/transmission-
grid.pdf); see also Kelliher Amici Brief, supra note 107, at 21-26 (citing legislative 
history supporting argument that Congress intended to grant FERC authority to 
override state agency denials of transmission line permits to address the changing 
needs of the interstate transmission grid such as grid reliability and to promote 
development of renewable energy resources). 
 137 See Piedmont Envtl. Council, 558 F.3d at 321. 
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the majority did not agree with this analysis and thus, despite the fact 
that Congress and federal agencies completed studies similar to those 
done in 1940s for interstate natural gas pipelines, EPAct 2005 has not 
resulted in any real shift of transmission siting authority away from 
the states. 
Finally, under a separate provision of EPAct 2005, Congress has 
granted two of the four federal power marketing administrations — 
the Western Area Power Administration (“WAPA”) and the 
Southwestern Power Administration (“SWPA”)138 — authority to 
design, develop, construct, or operate a new electric power 
transmission project within any state in which WAPA or SWPA 
operates if the Secretary of Energy determines that such project will 
reduce congestion of electricity transmission, is necessary to 
accommodate increased demand for electric transmission capacity, 
and meets other requirements.139 This statutory authority also allows 
WAPA and SWPA to participate with other entities in designing, 
constructing, or operating such projects, therefore facilitating public-
private collaboration on transmission lines.140 Notably, existing case 
law has held that electric transmission lines proposed by federal power 
administrations need not comply with state siting requirements or 
obtain state siting permits and may take private property using federal 
eminent domain authority.141 Thus, there is the potential for private 
parties seeking to construct transmission lines in states where WAPA 
and SWPA operate to work with those power marketing 
 
 138 “Four federal Power Marketing Administrations (PMAs) operate electric 
systems and sell the electrical output of federally owned and operated hydroelectric 
dams in 33 states.” Federal Power Marketing Administrations Operate Across Much of the 
United States, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (June 12, 2013), http://www.eia.gov/ 
todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=11651. They are the Bonneville Power Administration 
(“BPA”), the Western Area Power Administration (“WAPA”), the Southeastern Power 
Administration (“SEPA”), and the Southwestern Power Administration (“SWPA”). Id. 
“Of the four PMAs, BPA and WAPA are much larger in terms of the volume of 
electricity marketed than SWPA and SEPA.” Id. There is no PMA coverage in the 
northeastern states and for much of the Midwest. Id. Federal power agencies supply 
less than 1% of U.S. electricity needs. See supra note 100. 
 139 See Energy Policy Act of 2005, 42 U.S.C. § 16421(a) (2012). 
 140 Id. § 16421(b). 
 141 See, e.g., United States v. 14.02 Acres of Land More or Less in Fresno Cnty., 547 
F.3d 943, 953-54 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding WAPA was not required to comply with 
California law); Citizens & Landowners Against the Miles City/New Underwood 
Powerline v. Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 683 F.2d 1171 (8th Cir. 1982) (holding 
WAPA was not required to comply with South Dakota laws governing the siting and 
permitting of transmission lines or obtain a state siting permit prior to planning and 
constructing a new transmission line in the state). 
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administrations on projects and avoid the state transmission siting 
process. To date, neither WAPA nor SWPA have used their siting and 
eminent domain authority under EPAct 2005. 
III. THE MODERN ELECTRICITY GRID: ENERGY SOURCES, TRANSMISSION 
LINES, AND REGIONAL PLANNING 
This Part describes in more detail the modern electric grid and 
highlights major interstate transmission projects, as well as the 
difficulty of obtaining approval in all necessary states for such projects. 
It then turns to the changing nature of the energy sources powering the 
grid with a focus on the growing use of renewable energy, particularly 
wind, to generate electricity in many parts of the country. This Part 
ends with a discussion of the growing focus on RTOs as major players 
in managing the grid in many regions of country as well as wholesale 
markets for electricity within those regions. 
A. Existing Transmission Infrastructure, Future Needs, and Proposed 
Interstate Transmission Projects 
Today, electricity from nearly 7,000 power plants travels over 
450,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines in the United States, 
connecting with nearly 6 million miles of lower voltage distribution 
cables, to provide power to homes, businesses, and industrial 
facilities.142 The U.S. electric grid constitutes an $876 billion asset 
managed by over 3,000 utilities serving nearly 300 million 
customers.143 Unlike the interstate natural gas pipeline network, which 
has no state or regional boundaries, there are three separate and 
distinct electricity grids within the continental United States — the 
 
 142 See ECON. DEV. RESEARCH GRP., INC., AM. SOC’Y OF CIVIL ENG’RS, FAILURE TO ACT: THE 
ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CURRENT INVESTMENT TRENDS IN ELECTRICITY INFRASTRUCTURE 4-5 
(2011), available at http://www.asce.org/uploadedFiles/Issues_and_Advocacy/Our_ 
Initiatives/Infrastructure/Content_Pieces/failure-to-act-electricity-report.pdf (stating that 
there are over 450,000 miles of high-voltage transmission lines in the United States); MASS. 
INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 4 (stating that there are 6 million miles of low-voltage 
distribution lines); Ken Wells et al., Crumbling U.S. Grid Gets Jolt Driving Smart Houston 
Power, BLOOMBERG (June 25, 2014, 3:00 AM PDT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2014-06-25/crumbling-u-s-grid-gets-jolt-driving-smart-houston-power (stating that 
7,000 power plants supply electricity through 450,000 miles of high-voltage transmission 
lines). 
 143 See HARRIS WILLIAMS & CO., TRANSMISSION & DISTRIBUTION INFRASTRUCTURE 2 
(2014), available at http://www.harriswilliams.com/sites/default/files/industry_reports/ 
ep_td_white_paper_06_10_14_final.pdf?cm_mid=3575875 (stating that the grid 
services 300 million customers); Wells et al., supra note 142 (stating that the grid is a 
$876 billion asset and is serviced by over 3,000 utilities). 
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Eastern Interconnection, the Western Interconnection, and the 
Electric Reliability Council of Texas (“ERCOT”). There is essentially 
no transfer of electricity between the three interconnections.144 
 
Figure 1: U.S. Interconnections145 
 
These grids make up 73%, 19%, and 8%, respectively, of electricity 
sales in the United States.146 
Many experts warn that the U.S. transmission grid must be 
modernized and expanded to maintain reliability, to address 
increasingly severe weather events brought about by climate change, 
to address cyber security concerns, and to integrate more domestic 
renewable energy into the grid to achieve federal and state climate 
change goals.147 According to experts, power outages are becoming 
 
 144 See generally U.S. Dep’t of Energy, Learn More About Interconnections, ENERGY.GOV, 
http://energy.gov/oe/services/electricity-policy-coordination-and-implementation/ 
transmission-planning/recovery-act-0 (last visited Feb. 7, 2015) (explaining the 
function of the three main “interconnections” in the United States). The North 
American Electric Reliability Corporation (“NERC”), a non-governmental 
organization, works with eight regional entities to ensure bulk power reliability 
throughout the United States. About NERC, N. AM. ELEC. RELIABILITY CORP., 
http://www.nerc.com/ABOUTNERC/pages/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 18, 2015). 
 145 See NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS. ET AL., AMERICA’S ENERGY FUTURE: TECHNOLOGY AND 
TRANSFORMATION 568 fig.9.4 (2009). 
 146 MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 3. 
 147 See, e.g., CAMPBELL, supra note 9, at 7 (discussing the aging nature of the 
transmission grid); BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 1, at 28-33 (arguing that the 
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more frequent in the United States, and in order to maintain even 
current levels of grid reliability, the electric industry must make total 
investments on the scale of $1.5 to $2 trillion dollars and investments 
in transmission and distribution alone of nearly $900 billion.148 
Likewise, a 2013 White House report noted that “[s]evere weather is 
the number one cause of power outages in the United States and costs 
the economy billions of dollars a year in lost output and wages, 
spoiled inventory, delayed production, inconvenience and damage to 
grid infrastructure.”149 More important, the report points out that the 
“aging nature of the grid,” most of which was constructed over a 
 
grid’s infrastructure will need to be updated in order to meet renewable energy 
targets); ECON. DEV. RESEARCH GRP., supra note 142, at 4-9 (arguing that without 
increased investment in grid infrastructure, we will not be able to meet the growing 
demands for energy); MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 77 (arguing that one factor 
requiring an increased investment in transmission capacity is the need for more 
renewable energy sources); Klass, supra note 1, at 1116 (arguing that more 
transmission needs to be built in order to maintain reliability and meet new renewable 
energy targets); Klass & Wilson, supra note 1, at 1802 (arguing that the transmission 
infrastructure must be improved in order to incorporate domestic renewable energy); 
Ostrow, Grid Governance, supra note 1, at 1995-96 (arguing that the state-centered 
regulatory system is ineffective for regulating such a sprawling, interconnected 
system, such as the grid); Rossi, supra note 1, at 1018-33 (arguing that existing state 
regulation of the grid is inadequate to address competitive wholesale markets and 
climate change goals). See generally EDISON ELEC. INST., TRANSMISSION PROJECTS: AT A 
GLANCE, at iii (2014) (showing increases in transmission investment from 2011–2013 
but then a projecting a slight decline in investment from 2013–2016); Investment in 
Electricity Transmission Infrastructure Shows Steady Increase, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. 
(Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=17711 (reporting 
that after a thirty-year decline in transmission investment, more recent trends from 
1997–2012 show increased investment in transmission infrastructure by public 
utilities and other power providers to improve reliability and to connect load centers 
to renewable energy resources). 
 148 See, e.g., MARC W. CHUPKA ET AL., EDISON FOUND., TRANSFORMING AMERICA’S 
POWER INDUSTRY: THE INVESTMENT CHALLENGE 2010–2030, at iv-xi (2008), available at 
http://assets.fiercemarkets.com/public/sites/energy/reports/transformingamericaspower
.pdf (summarizing costs of grid investment); Massoud Amin, Toward a More Secure, 
Strong and Smart Electric Power Grid, IEEE SMART GRID (IEEE, Piscataway, N.J.), Jan. 
2011, available at http://smartgrid.ieee.org/january-2011/67-toward-a-more-secure-
strong-and-smart-electric-power-grid (“In the electricity sector, outages and power 
quality disturbances cost the economy, on average, more than $80 billion annually 
and sometimes as much as $188 billion in a single year.”); Wells et al., supra note 142 
(“Power outages are up 285 percent since 1984 and the U.S. ranks last among the top 
nine western industrialized nations in the average time that it takes to get the light 
back on after power failures. Outages cost businesses as much as $150 billion a year in 
lost continuity . . . .”).  
 149 EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, ECONOMIC BENEFITS OF INCREASING ELECTRIC 
GRID RESILIENCE TO WEATHER OUTAGES 4 (2013), available at http://energy.gov/sites/ 
prod/files/2013/08/f2/Grid%20Resiliency%20Report_FINAL.pdf. 
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period of more than one hundred years, makes the country more 
susceptible to severe weather-related power outages.150 The report also 
warns that the number of outages “is expected to rise as climate 
change increases the frequency and intensity of hurricanes, blizzards, 
floods and other extreme weather events.”151 “In 2012, the United 
States suffered eleven billion-dollar weather disasters — the second-
most for any year on record, behind only 2011.”152 
As for augmenting the nation’s supply of renewable electricity, new 
long-distance interstate electric transmission lines are a critical aspect 
of achieving that goal. Unlike competing sources of electricity such as 
coal, uranium, and natural gas, which can be transported to consumers 
via pipelines, rail, truck, or ship, large-scale renewable energy such as 
wind or solar energy can only be transported through transmission 
lines.153 As a result, expanding the electric transmission system is 
critical to increasing the nation’s supply of renewable electricity 
because these sources of energy are generated in states like Kansas, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Montana, and rural parts of Texas, 
Illinois, Oregon, and Iowa, which are generally far from load centers.154 
The regulatory framework for transmission lines that gives states 
virtually exclusive siting and eminent domain authority for both 
interstate and intrastate transmission lines has significant implications 
for the future of the grid. A 2011 interdisciplinary study by MIT 
entitled The Future of the Electric Grid devotes an entire chapter to 
regulatory policy affecting transmission expansion, with particular 
focus on the issue of integrating large-scale renewable generation.155 It 
concludes that current siting procedures are often biased against 
approving interstate transmission projects and are a significant barrier 
to adequate and efficient transmission expansion.156 The report 
recommends better planning of regional transmission projects, better 
compilation of data on the U.S. bulk power system, the use of regional 
and interconnection cost allocation procedures to better share the cost 
 
 150 Id. 
 151 Id. 
 152 Id. 
 153 As noted earlier, although rooftop solar and other distributed renewable energy 
resources do not rely on transmission lines, such energy resources so far make up only 
a small percentage of total renewable electricity resources although that percentage is 
likely to increase substantially in the future. See supra note 5. 
 154 See United States — Average Annual Wind Speed at 80 m, NAT’L RENEWABLE 
ENERGY LAB., http://www.nrel.gov/gis/images/80m_wind/USwind300dpe4-11.jpg (last 
visited Apr. 4, 2015) (map showing high potential wind areas in purple). 
 155 MASS. INST. OF TECH., supra note 1, at 77-108. 
 156 Id. at 100. 
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of long-distance transmission, and enhanced federal siting authority 
for interstate transmission lines.157 
A 2013 report by the Bipartisan Policy Center entitled Capitalizing 
on the Evolving Power Sector, Policies for a Modern and Reliable U.S. 
Electric Grid also highlights the limitations of the state siting process 
for interstate transmission lines, particularly those high-voltage, long-
distance lines necessary to transport renewable energy to load 
centers.158 According to the report: 
Siting new transmission lines is often a prolonged, expensive, 
and contentious undertaking. . . . In recent decades . . . the 
evolution of interstate and regional electricity markets has 
increasingly necessitated long-line, interstate transmission 
projects. Further, the extent of [variable energy resource] 
integration that will be required by existing state renewable 
portfolio requirements, and the reality that many renewable 
resources are located at a distance from load, will likely create 
a greater need for new long-line transmission in some regions. 
. . . Under the current siting regime, the developer of a 
multistate transmission line must obtain requisite approvals 
from state and local authorities along the full length of the 
line . . . . For their part, individual state authorities may be 
bound by state statutes to accept or reject the project on the 
basis of their in-state transmission needs, or the in-state 
benefits that the project offers. In these cases, states may not 
be empowered to consider the regional benefits of a proposed 
project. Thus, a project that transmits power generated in one 
state, passes through a second state, and serves load in a third 
state could have difficulty winning approval from regulators in 
the second state. In some states, regulators might even be 
required by law to reject a project that does not serve load 
within the state’s boundaries, even in cases where the project 
delivers broader benefits to the region at large that the state 
would share in over time.159 
Despite these regulatory hurdles, both public utilities and private or 
“merchant” transmission companies160 are attempting to build long-
 
 157 Id. at 102-04. 
 158 BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., supra note 1, at 5. 
 159 Id. at 28-29; accord Hoecker & Smith, supra note 125, at 86-88 (discussing state 
siting barriers to interstate transmission projects). 
 160 “[M]erchant transmission companies . . . generate revenue solely from contracts 
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distance, interstate transmission lines to improve grid reliability and 
transport new sources of renewable energy to load centers. Recent 
efforts include: 
• The Montana Alberta Tie Line, a 214-mile, 230-kV 
merchant line running between Lethbridge, Alberta 
and Great Falls, Montana to transport Montana wind 
energy.161 
• The Zephyr Transmission Project, owned by Duke-
ATC, a proposed 950-mile 500-kV line from 
southeastern Wyoming to Las Vegas, Nevada designed 
to connect wind-rich areas of Wyoming to load centers 
in California and the southwestern United States and 
expected to be in service by 2020.162 
• The $6.8 billion Texas Competitive Renewable Energy 
Zone (“CREZ”) project consisting of eight years of 
planning and new construction of 3,600 miles of high-
voltage transmission lines across portions of central 
and West Texas to integrate 16,000 MW of wind 
energy into the Texas grid.163 
• The SunZia Southwest Transmission Project, two 
proposed bi-directional 500-kV lines in Arizona and 
 
they sign with electricity generators to transmit electricity . . . for delivery to [utilities 
and other electricity providers to sell to] the retail market.” Klass, supra note 1, at 
1081 n.7 (citing Heidi Werntz, Let’s Make a Deal: Negotiated Rates for Merchant 
Transmission, 28 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 421, 424 n.13 (2011)). By contrast, public 
utilities and independent transmission companies receive a cost-based rate of return 
from electricity users through the state public utility commission ratemaking process. 
Id. at 1121. 
 161 Montana-Alberta Tie-Line, ENBRIDGE, http://www.enbridge.com/DeliveringEnergy/ 
Power-Transmission/Montana-Alberta-Tie-Line.aspx (last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 162 EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 147, at 35. 
 163 See Daniel Cusick, New Power Lines Will Make Texas the World’s 5th-Largest 
Wind Power Producer, CLIMATEWIRE (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/ 
climatewire/stories/1059995041. It is important to note that Texas is unique in its 
ability to plan and site large-scale transmission lines for renewable energy 
development because it has its own grid (ERCOT) and the state includes both major 
population centers and significant wind energy resources. See Klass & Wilson, supra 
note 1, at 1843-47 (discussing CREZ projects and uniqueness of Texas); Matthew L. 
Wald, Wired for Wind, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2014, at B1 [hereinafter Wired for Wind], 
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/24/business/energy-environment/texas-
is-wired-for-wind-power-and-more-farms-plug-in.html (reporting on completion of 
Texas CREZ projects). 
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New Mexico designed to spur development of 
renewable energy in those states and anticipated to be 
in service by 2020.164 
• Five separate DC high-voltage transmission projects by 
Clean Line Energy Partners, a merchant transmission 
company, each travelling between 200 and 900 miles 
designed to bring wind energy to population 
centers.165 
• The Multi-Value Projects (“MVPs”) in the 
Midcontinent Independent System Operator (“MISO”) 
region designed to enhance grid reliability and help 
the MISO states meet renewable portfolio standards by 
allowing more transmission of wind energy 
throughout the region, and imposing cost sharing 
among utilities within MISO.166 
 
 164 See Welcome to the SunZia Transmission Project, SUNZIA, http://www.sunzia.net/ 
(last visited Feb. 13, 2015). 
 165 See Projects, CLEAN LINE ENERGY PARTNERS, http://www.cleanlineenergy.com (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2015). The five Clean Line Energy Partners projects are the Rock Island 
Clean Line (bringing wind energy from northern Iowa to Illinois and states east of Illinois), 
the Grain Belt Express Clean Line (bringing wind energy from western Kansas to Missouri, 
Illinois and states east of Illinois), the Plains & Eastern Clean Line (bringing wind energy 
from the Oklahoma Panhandle region to southeastern states), the Centennial West Clean 
Line (line from Northeast New Mexico to California designed to develop wind and solar 
energy in the region), and the Western Spirit Clean Line (bringing renewable power from 
New Mexico to Western markets working together with the Centennial West Clean Line). 
See id. The Centennial West Clean Line had entered into a partnership with WAPA and 
thus may be able to take advantage of the federal siting authority discussed in Part II.C, 
under section 1222 of EPAct 2005. See generally Press Release, W. Area Power Admin. & 
Clean Line Energy Partners, Centennial West Clean Line, Western Sign Agreement for 
Transmission Project Development (June 18, 2012), available at http://www. 
centennialwestcleanline.com/sites/centennial_west/media/docs/FINAL_Centennial_West_P
ress_Release_061812.pdf (announcing the partnership between WAPA and Clean Line 
Energy Partners). The Plains & Eastern Clean Line has sought to enter into a similar 
relationship with SWPA under section 1222 of EPAct 2005. See Letter from Tom Kiernan, 
CEO, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, to Ernest Moniz, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Energy (May 15, 
2014), available at http://www.plainsandeasterncleanline.com/sites/plains_eastern/media/ 
docs/AWEA_Letter_of_Support.pdf (urging Department of Energy “to move forward as 
expeditiously as possible to a final decision under your Section 1222 authority on the 
Plains & Eastern Clean Line and other projects that will facilitate the deployment of wind 
energy”). 
 166 See Ill. Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 771-75 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(describing MISO’s MVP projects as lines designed to facilitate increase in renewable 
energy generation and integration within MISO region); Glen Boshart, MISO: MVP 
Project Benefits Larger than Previously Thought, SNL (Oct. 1, 2014, 6:16 PM ET), 
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• The Great Northern Transmission Line, a 500-kV line 
designed to run between Winnipeg, Manitoba and 
northeastern Minnesota to transport both hydropower 
and wind energy and proposed to be in service by 
2020.167 
• The Northern Pass Transmission Line, a 187-mile 
power line to connect significant hydropower 
resources in Quebec to population centers in New 
England.168 
Both public utilities and private merchant lines are investing in new, 
large-scale transmission projects, many of which are DC rather than 
AC. Although the U.S. electric grid runs predominantly on AC, many 
of the proposed long-distance transmission lines for wind are DC 
because DC is more efficient and results in less line losses, even 
though it limits the number of “on ramps” and “off ramps” along the 
path of the line.169 Notably, the time, cost, and multi-state regulatory 
hurdles associated with such lines are significant and most of the 
projects listed above are still in the state permitting process. Moreover, 
there are far fewer large-scale renewable energy projects proposed for 
the eastern United States, highlighting the difficulty of constructing 
new transmission lines east of the Mississippi River.170 
Projects of this magnitude can take more than a decade to plan, 
propose, and obtain regulatory approval from multiple states prior to 
 
https://www.snl.com/InteractiveX/Article.aspx?cdid=A-29379703-12582 (reporting on 
a 2014 MISO study showing that the MVPs will offer “between $13.1 billion and $49 
billion in net benefits over the next 20 to 40 years, an increase of approximately 50% 
from the 2011 estimates” and that the MVP projects will help states meet their 
renewable energy requirements because the increased transmission will reduce wind 
curtailments due to insufficient transmission); see, e.g., EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 
147, at 68 (describing Mid-American Energy Expansion as “an integral part” of the 
portfolio of MISO MVP projects). 
 167 EDISON ELEC. INST., supra note 147, at 78-79. 
 168 See Sam Evans-Brown, Understanding Northern Pass, N.H. MAG. (Jan. 2014), 
http://www.nhmagazine.com/January-2014/Understanding-Northern-Pass/. 
 169 See Klass, supra note 1, at 1111 & n.196 (providing descriptions of AC and DC 
and benefits and drawbacks of each type of current). 
 170 See, e.g., Rossi, supra note 1, at 1021-22 (discussing state opposition to 
interstate transmission lines in Arizona and Connecticut); Evans-Brown, supra note 
168 (discussing controversy over Northern Pass project); see also BIPARTISAN POLICY 
CTR., supra note 1, at 28-29 (stating that regulatory approval for interstate 
transmission projects is difficult to obtain and discussing a project denial by 
regulatory authorities in Arkansas). 
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the actual construction process.171 Then there are often more years of 
delay due to legal challenges to the lines on grounds ranging from 
whether one or more states properly issued the certificate of need, to 
whether an RTO is justified in imposing the cost of such transmission 
lines on all utilities in the region, to whether the line constitutes a 
“public use” justifying eminent domain under various state laws.172 
This stands in contrast to interstate natural gas pipelines, which can 
often be built on a twelve-month to two-year timeline with one-stop 
shopping at FERC.173 
For instance, in the summer of 2014, the Wisconsin Public Service 
Commission (“PSC”) held hearings to determine the need for and 
environmental impacts associated with the Badger-Coulee Line. MISO 
had designated this 345-kV line as a high-priority line that would 
offset the need for about $160 million to $180 million in lower voltage 
transmission system upgrades in western Wisconsin, provide local 
utilities with increased access to wholesale energy markets, and 
establish another pathway for renewable energy into Wisconsin and to 
load centers in other states.174 During the Wisconsin PSC hearings, 
landowners and citizen groups questioned “why Wisconsinites should 
have to give up their land and views so generators in the Dakotas can 
ship surplus energy to the East Coast.”175 
Similar concerns have been raised as public hearings in Missouri for 
the Grain Belt Express, one of the Clean Line Energy Partner DC 
 
 171 See Alison Silverstein, Presentation at the NCEP Transmission Technology 
Workshop: Transmission 101, at 51 (Apr. 20–21, 2011), http://www.naruc.org/grants/ 
Documents/Silverstein%20NCEP%20T-101%200420111.pdf. See generally NAT’L ELEC. 
MFRS. ASS’N, SITING TRANSMISSION CORRIDORS — A REAL GAME OF CHUTES AND LADDERS 
(2011), available at http://www.nema.org/Communications/Documents/tC_gameboard_ 
vertical.pdf (providing the gameboard for a game that explains how the siting process 
works). 
 172 See, e.g., Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Completing the Process of Restructuring the 
Electricity Market, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 451, 483-85 (2005) (“The causes of the 
growing shortage of transmission capacity are well known and well documented. 
FERC has not yet devised and implemented a method of encouraging adequate 
investment in transmission capacity, and NIMBY-based opposition to proposed 
transmission expansion projects dooms most projects at the state and local agencies 
that now have authority to authorize or veto such projects.”). 
 173 See supra notes 44, 58–59 and accompanying text. 
 174 News Release, Am. Transmission Co., PSC Deems Badger Coulee Transmission Line 
Project Application Complete (Apr. 30, 2014), available at http://www.atcllc.com/whats-
current/psc-deems-badger-coulee-transmission-line-project-application-complete/. 
 175 Danielle Endvick, Farmers, Rural Landowners Opposing Transmission Project Say 
It Puts Their Lifestyle . . . On the Line, COUNTRY TODAY (June 16, 2014, 8:22 AM), 
http://www.thecountrytoday.com/front_page/article_5963e286-f559-11e3-9dc9-
0019bb2963f4.html. 
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transmission lines in the Midwest designed to transport wind energy 
to population centers in the east.176 The Grain Belt Express would 
travel through four states, including Missouri.177 At the hearing, critics 
of the line argued the costs to Missouri landowners exceeded the 
project’s benefits. One landowner stated, “Grain Belt says they’re going 
to bring power to Missouri. They mean through Missouri . . . . If the 
East Coast wants wind power, let them produce it locally.”178 
However, one county commissioner representing a Missouri county 
receiving property tax benefits from a new oil pipeline through the 
state argued that if landowners are paid a fair price for their land, they 
should accept projects that will benefit “the greater good.”179 He 
questioned, “Where would we be if we had stopped all of these 
projects many years ago?”180 
Further east, some environmental groups in Vermont have provided 
cautious support for new transmission lines to bring hydropower and 
wind energy from Quebec and New York through Vermont to 
southern New England states. But many interested parties question 
whether such lines will only serve out-of-state generators or whether 
they will provide any in-state benefits by transporting Vermont energy 
resources or bringing new renewable energy resources to Vermont 
customers.181 
The fact that major, interstate transmission lines are subject to 
frequent opposition from local residents or state regulators does not in 
and of itself mean the process for siting transmission lines is broken. 
History is replete with examples of large-scale infrastructure projects 
 
 176 See Jeffrey Tomich, Clean Line Transmission Project Gets Chilly Reception in Mo., 
ENERGYWIRE (Aug. 13, 2014), http://www.eenews.net/energywire/2014/08/13/stories/ 
1060004417. 
 177 Id. 
 178 Id. (quoting Phillip Brown of Moberly, Mo.) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 179 Id. 
 180 Id. (quoting Glenn Eagan, Cnty. Comm’r, Shelbyville, Missouri) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 181 John Herrick, Renewable Energy Group Backs Vermont as Transmission Corridor, 
VTDIGGER.ORG (Apr. 22, 2014, 7:28 PM), http://vtdigger.org/2014/04/22/renewable-
energy-group-backs-vermont-transmission-corridor/ (“‘Is this just a super highway, or 
is this going to be [a] highway with off ramps that could bring renewable energy into 
Vermont communities or needed transmission so we can bring more Vermont 
renewable energy into our grid? That’s what I don’t know’ . . . .” (quoting Johanna 
Miller, Energy Program Dir., Vt. Natural Res. Council)). For a discussion of other 
interstate transmission line projects where state PUCs denied approval because the 
line would not provide power to state residents, see Hoecker & Smith, supra note 125, 
at 86-88. 
  
2015] The Electric Grid at a Crossroads 1931 
that never should have been built and for which roadblocks in the 
form of local siting requirements, organized opposition, or enhanced 
environmental laws may have led to better outcomes.182 Nevertheless, 
with regard to multi-state projects designed to meet regional 
transmission and energy needs, there is a misalignment between the 
scope of such projects and the state agencies and courts with authority 
to review and approve those projects. 
B. Fuel Sources for the Grid and Integrating Renewable Energy 
Just as the 1930s and 1940s brought major changes in the sources of 
energy used to heat the nation’s residences and industries, the first two 
decades of the 21st century have brought significant shifts in the 
sources of electricity used to power the grid. For instance, in 2013, the 
percentage of net U.S. power generation from coal declined to just 
39%, down from a high of 55% in 1990.183 At the same time, electricity 
generated from natural gas increased to 27% in 2013, up from only 
 
 182 Major highways built through city neighborhoods and parks, which led to 
urban decay and destruction of parkland, and massive hydroelectric dams in the West 
with little energy benefits but significant environmental harm are just two examples. 
See, e.g., San Antonio Conservation Soc’y v. Texas Highway Dep’t, 400 U.S. 968, 968-
69 (1970) (Black, J., dissenting) (expressing dismay at refusal of the Supreme Court to 
review the U.S. Department of Highway’s decision to approve a highway that would 
destroy a city park); St. Paul Branch of NAACP v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 764 F. Supp. 
2d 1092, 1097 n.3 (D. Minn. 2011) (discussing the Rondo neighborhood of St. Paul 
which was “devastated when it was divided to build Interstate Highway 94 (‘I-94’) 
between Minneapolis and St. Paul” in the 1960s in reviewing a proposed light rail 
project through relocated Rondo neighborhood); MARC REISNER, CADILLAC DESERT: THE 
AMERICAN WEST AND ITS DISAPPEARING WATER (1986) (discussing adverse 
environmental impacts and questionable benefits associated with the construction of 
major federal dams and hydropower projects in the West). Indeed, the National 
Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and other federal and state environmental laws 
enacted in the 1970s were intentionally designed to slow down the permitting process 
so that the potential adverse environmental impacts of major projects could be 
analyzed in a manner that could potentially limit those impacts or prevent projects 
entirely. See generally WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, FIGHTING WESTWAY: ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, 
CITIZEN ACTIVISM, AND THE REGULATORY WAR THAT TRANSFORMED NEW YORK CITY 
(2014) (discussing the background of NEPA and explaining the federal involvement 
in the permitting process). 
 183 See Electricity Emissions in the United States, CTR. FOR CLIMATE & ENERGY 
SOLUTIONS, http://www.c2es.org/technology/overview/electricity (last visited Feb. 13, 
2015) [hereinafter Electricity Emissions]; Jeffrey Logan, U.S. Power Sector Undergoes 
Dramatic Shift in Generation Mix, NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB.: RENEWABLE ENERGY 
PROJECT FIN. (Feb. 26, 2013, 10:00 AM), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/us-
power-sector-undergoes-dramatic-shift-generation-mix. 
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12% in 1990.184 Non-hydropower renewables increased from 
essentially zero in the late 1980s to nearly 7% by 2013.185 Moreover, in 
the first quarter of 2014, for the first time, non-hydropower renewable 
energy generation exceeded hydropower renewable energy generation, 
which constituted just over 6% of total generation during that same 
period.186 Renewable energy as a whole made up 13% of total net 
electricity generation in 2013.187 
To put these numbers in historical perspective, in 1950, coal 
provided almost 50% of U.S. net power generation, hydropower was at 
30%, natural gas was at just under 15%, petroleum was at 10%, and 
non-hydropower renewables and nuclear energy were at zero.188 
During the 1970s and 1980s, coal fluctuated between 45% and 55% of 
total U.S. net generation, hydropower had declined to between 10% 
and 20%, and natural gas remained at 15% after a brief increase to 25% 
in the 1960s, while nuclear energy climbed to 20% and petroleum 
declined to less than 5% of total net generation and then to less than 
1% by 2013. Table 1 provides a summary of these trends. 
 
  
 
 184 See Electricity Emissions, supra note 183; Logan, supra note 183. 
 185 See Electricity Emissions, supra note 183; Logan, supra note 183. 
 186 See Kenneth Bossong, Non-Hydro Renewables Outproduce Hydro for First Time Ever, 
RENEWABLEENERGYWORLD.COM (May 23, 2014), http://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ 
rea/news/article/2014/05/non-hydro-renewables-outproduce-hydro-for-first-time-ever 
(citing U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., ELECTRIC POWER MONTHLY WITH DATA FOR MARCH 2014 
(May 2014), available at http://www.eia.gov/electricity/monthly/current_year/ 
may2014.pdf) (noting data through March 31, 2014); see also Logan, supra note 183 
(showing changes in energy mix for electricity). 
 187 Energy in Brief: How Much U.S. Electricity Is Generated from Renewable Energy?, 
U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., http://www.eia.gov/energy_in_brief/article/renewable_ 
electricity.cfm (last updated Apr. 14, 2014). Although solar remains less than 1% of 
total net U.S. electricity generation, its growth has been significant over the past two 
years and, according to EIA, the published solar numbers understate growth in that 
sector because “[u]nlike other energy sources, significant levels of solar capacity exist 
in smaller, non-utility-scale applications — e.g., rooftop solar photovoltaics.” Bossong, 
supra note 186. 
 188 See Logan, supra note 183. 
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Table 1. U.S. Net Electricity Generation by Source189 
 
 1950 1970 1990 2013 
Coal 47% 44% 55% 39% 
Natural Gas 13% 22% 12% 28% 
Nuclear 0% 2% 20% 20% 
Hydropower 31% 18% 10% 7% 
Non-Hydropower 
Renewables  
0% 0% 2% 6% 
Petroleum 10% 18% 3% 0.7% 
 
Notably, there are huge variations among the states in the sources of 
energy they use for electricity. For instance, EIA data from 2012 
indicate that West Virginia (95%), Kentucky (93%), Missouri (83%), 
and North Dakota (79%) rely predominantly on coal for electricity 
generation.190 By contrast, New York (4%), California (1%), and Maine 
(.05%) rely very little on coal to generate electricity.191 Mississippi 
(60%), California (59%), and Texas (47%) all rely on natural gas to 
generate a significant percentage of electricity in the state.192 And 
Idaho (58%), Washington (69%), and Oregon (56%) rely mostly on 
hydropower for their electricity needs.193 
This same variation exists to an even greater degree with regard to 
non-hydropower renewable energy. For many years now, wind energy 
has been the main driver in increasing the percentage of non-
hydropower renewable energy on the grid. In 2013, wind power in the 
United States, which produced over 61,000 MW of electric generating 
capacity, exceeded 4% of the U.S. power grid for the first time.194 
 
 189 See Electricity Emissions, supra note 183; Logan, supra note 183. Percentages in 
Table 1 are approximate. 
 190 Facts & Figures — According to EIA Data, AM. COAL. FOR CLEAN COAL ELEC.: 
AM.’S POWER (July 2013), http://www.americaspower.org/according-to-eia-data 
(summarizing 2013 EIA data). 
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. 
 193 Id. 
 194 See Press Release, Am. Wind Energy Ass’n, American Wind Power Reaches Major 
Power Generation Milestones in 2013 (Mar. 5, 2013), available at http://www.awea.org/ 
MediaCenter/pressrelease.aspx?ItemNumber=6184 [hereinafter AWEA Press Release]; 
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According to the National Renewable Energy Laboratory, there exists 
over 10 million MW of onshore wind resources in the United States, 
enough to power 10 times the nation’s total electricity needs.195 At the 
start of 2014, there were 12,000 MW of additional wind project 
capacity under construction. That growth may slow in future years, 
however, based on the potential expiration of the production tax 
credit for wind, low natural gas prices, and low growth in demand for 
new electricity.196 But there is significant variation in the use of wind 
power for generating capacity among the states. For instance, wind 
power now exceeds 25% of total electricity production in both Iowa 
and South Dakota and provides more than 12% of electricity 
production in nine states and over 5% in twelve states.197 As a result of 
these increases, wind is now the fifth largest electricity source in the 
United States, behind coal, natural gas, nuclear, and hydropower.198 
All renewable energy sources together, such as wind, solar, and 
hydropower, provide nearly 13% of the U.S. electricity supply.199 But 
in many states, particularly in the southeast, wind generates virtually 
no electricity at all.200 And Texas has installed over 12,000 MW of 
wind energy on its own, more than double the amount produced by 
the next highest ranked states.201 These regional variations highlight 
the need for a regional or national approach to transmission siting to 
meet current concerns associated with integrating non-fossil fuel 
energy resources into the grid on a more widespread basis. 
Both state renewable portfolio standards (“RPSs”) that exist in more 
than twenty-five states and EPA’s 2014 Clean Power Plan proposed 
rule will lead to increased renewable energy generation throughout the 
country and increased trading of renewable energy credits (“RECs”). 
RPSs require utilities to generate a certain percentage — generally 
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between 15% and 30% — of the electricity they sell from renewable 
energy resources by 2020, 2025, 2030, or a similar date, or purchase 
RECs from other in-state or out-of-state power providers, thus 
creating interstate markets for renewable energy.202 
Under EPA’s Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, released in June 2014, 
the electric power sector would be required to reduce carbon emissions 
by 30% from 2005 levels by 2030.203 Under the rule, states would be 
required to implement plans to achieve this goal. While the means of 
obtaining compliance would vary from state to state, EPA projects that 
by 2030, coal-fired electricity would drop to about 30% of the nation’s 
total electricity supply, with significant increases in the use of natural gas 
and renewable energy sources in addition to energy efficiency 
improvements.204 EPA’s rule also allows the purchase of RECs to meet 
the rule’s requirements, which will spur additional generation of 
renewable energy and sales of credits in those states with ample 
renewable energy resources.205 Thus, the shift away from coal and 
towards both natural gas and renewable energy will increase in future 
years. Even though in 2012 coal provided only 39% of U.S. net electricity 
generation, it was responsible for approximately 75% of U.S. electricity-
related GHG emissions, thus explaining EPA’s focus on reducing the use 
of coal-fired power in order to meet climate change goals.206 
 
 202 See Alexandra B. Klass & Elizabeth Henley, Energy Policy, Extraterritoriality, 
and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 5 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 127, 155 
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1060000624. 
 206 See Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, Electricity Sector Emissions, U.S. ENVTL. 
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C. Regional Grid Governance and RTOs 
Unlike the national network of federally-sited interstate pipelines 
used to transport natural gas throughout the nation, the U.S. 
transmission grid is cleanly divided into the three, distinct 
interconnections.207 Within these three transmission grids, ISOs and 
RTOs are FERC-approved nongovernmental agencies that manage 
portions of the transmission grid and regional markets for wholesale 
power for much of the country. From electricity’s early days, 
bordering utilities long had coordinated with each other. Eventually, 
groups of neighboring utilities, especially in geographically smaller 
states, formed “power pools,” or “tight power pools,” that operated in 
sync with each other.208 Beginning in 1999 with Order 2000, FERC 
encouraged power pools to cede operation of their transmission 
systems to RTOs or ISOs that would also run power markets in the 
region.209 
 
 
(last updated July 2, 2014). 
 207 See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
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Figure 2: Regional Transmission Organizations210 
 
RTOs and ISOs tend to have three key functions. The first is that 
these groups — which are typically non-profit organizations formed 
by member utilities, independent power producers, municipalities, 
cooperatives, and other players in the electricity market — physically 
run, operate, and help plan the transmission grid. Utilities that built 
the grid maintain their ownership in the physical lines, but the RTO or 
ISO handles day-to-day operation of the system. Second, RTOs and 
ISOs typically operate and set prices for the wholesale electricity 
markets within their jurisdictions. Finally, RTOs and ISOs play a 
major role in planning the expansion of electricity grids within their 
footprints.211 
Membership in RTOs is voluntary and utilities may join RTOs or 
leave them at will.212 For instance, in 2013, Entergy, a major utility 
with a significant presence in Mississippi and Louisiana, joined MISO, 
significantly expanding that RTO’s footprint and prompting MISO to 
change its name from the Midwest Independent System Operator to 
the Midcontinent Independent System Operator to reflect its new 
 
 210 Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO)/Independent System Operators (ISO), 
FED. ENERGY REGULATORY COMM’N (last updated June 15, 2015), http://www.ferc.gov/ 
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 211 DAVIES ET AL., supra note 48, at 436-39. 
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geographic scope.213 Although FERC initially considered making 
membership in an RTO mandatory, it eventually instead required that 
public utilities either join a FERC-approved RTO or report on their 
progress toward joining one. Political opposition and industry 
resistance from utilities in the Southeast and West have so far 
prevented more complete coverage of the U.S. electric grid by RTOs 
but that may change in future years.214 As shown in Figure 2, RTOs 
cover approximately two-thirds of the U.S. population and meet 
approximately the same amount of U.S. electricity demand.215 
In parts of the United States where RTOs do govern many aspects of 
electricity transmission, both FERC and the courts have in recent 
years enhanced the importance of these organizations. For instance, 
FERC Order 1000 directs electricity providers to formally cooperate to 
consider the benefits of interstate transmission.216 Each public utility 
transmission provider must participate in a regional transmission 
planning process through an RTO or otherwise; establish transmission 
needs based on “public policy” requirements, which include state 
RPSs and other federal laws and regulations; and coordinate with 
transmission providers in neighboring regions to determine the most 
cost-effective solutions to mutual transmission needs.217 Order 1000 
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also eliminates certain incumbent utilities’ “right of first refusal” to 
build transmission lines within their territories in order to allow 
market forces to spur the development of new transmission lines. One 
of the purposes of Order 1000 is to prioritize lines to serve renewable 
energy goals and make those lines more affordable.218 Thus, Order 
1000 mandates a regional transmission planning process for the first 
time with RTOs playing a central role in the process in the areas where 
they exist, and places regional planning process requirements on all 
public utility transmission providers regardless of whether they are 
part of an RTO. In 2014, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit 
upheld FERC’s authority under the FPA to impose the requirements of 
Order 1000 on utilities in the face of multiple legal challenges.219 
Another development that highlights the growing importance of 
RTOs is the 2013 decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in Illinois Commerce Commission v. FERC.220 In that 
case, Judge Richard Posner, writing for the court, reviewed FERC’s 
approval of a request by MISO to impose a tariff on its 130 members to 
fund construction of new high-voltage power lines known as “multi-
value projects” or MVPs.221 The tariff is designed to finance the 
construction of transmission lines to bring wind energy generated in 
the western portion of MISO (i.e., Iowa, North Dakota, Minnesota) to 
urban centers further east within MISO. MISO allocated the cost of the 
MVPs among the utilities drawing power from the MISO grid in 
proportion to each utility’s share of the region’s total wholesale 
consumption of electricity rather than focusing on the extent to which 
each utility’s customers would actually use the lines. In other words, 
MISO allocated the costs across the entire region based on electricity 
use, which meant utilities serving urban centers would pay more even 
though the lines to be built were often quite distant from those urban 
centers. The FPA requires that all fees imposed (or approved) by 
FERC be “just and reasonable” which the courts have interpreted as 
being “at least roughly proportionate to the anticipated benefits to a 
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utility of being able to use the grid.”222 Notably, in an earlier decision 
written by Judge Posner in 2009, also entitled Illinois Commerce 
Commission v. FERC, the court had struck down a transmission cost 
allocation tariff the PJM RTO had attempted to impose on its members 
to finance interstate transmission lines on grounds that PJM and FERC 
had failed to sufficiently estimate the costs and benefits for FPA 
compliance.223 
In its 2013 decision, however, the court affirmed the broad cost 
allocation for the MVP lines and in doing so focused on the 
importance of renewable energy, grid reliability, and transmission 
expansion on a regional basis.224 The court discussed the difficulty of 
meeting state RPSs without interstate transmission lines to move large 
amounts of wind power from the windy, lightly populated plains in 
the middle of the country to the coasts where more people live; the 
environmental and energy security benefits associated with developing 
domestic renewable energy; and the importance of taking those 
benefits into account when considering the costs of connecting remote 
wind farms to the grid and who should pay.225 This decision, by 
deferring to MISO’s allocation of costs and benefits, allows RTOs 
much greater leeway in planning for regional transmission upgrades 
and imposing those costs on a regional rather than a local basis. In 
order words, it reaffirms and to some extent expands the importance 
of RTOs and regional entities in general in managing the grid and 
making important decisions for the grid on a regional basis. This 
authority for regional governance of the transmission grid stands in 
contrast to the natural gas pipeline network. While Congress shifted 
authority over pipelines directly from the states to the federal 
government, in regards to the transmission grid, there is already a 
significant role for regional entities, even if their authority does not yet 
include siting or eminent domain power. 
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IV. NEXT STEPS: THE ELECTRIC GRID AT A CROSSROADS AND THE 
POTENTIAL FOR A REGIONAL SOLUTION 
The regulatory structure for interstate electric transmission lines no 
longer matches current policy preferences regarding the use of 
renewable energy resources and for many decades has not matched 
either the contours of the physical grid or electricity markets. Until 
recently, however, it was difficult to argue for a change in the status 
quo. Of course, interstate transmission lines have always been difficult 
to site and build in light of landowner, environmental group, and 
sometimes state agency opposition, as well as the patchwork of state 
laws governing siting and eminent domain. But until now, state siting 
laws have not created any real crisis in electricity access as existed 
with regard to natural gas access in the 1940s. 
As described in Part I, the history of the development of U.S. energy 
transportation infrastructure illustrates that there have been critical 
points in time where the federal government has stepped in to address 
a national need for energy infrastructure development and created a 
federal siting process that displaces state law. With regard to natural 
gas pipelines, by the 1940s the nation’s businesses, industries, and 
homes had become dependent on natural gas. At that same time, states 
were refusing to allow interstate pipelines to be constructed because 
those pipelines did not provide a direct, public use for state residents. 
When natural gas shortages on the East Coast resulted in significant 
industry layoffs in the winter of 1946–1947 as a result of regional 
natural gas shortages, Congress responded by amending the Natural 
Gas Act to provide nationwide siting, permitting, and eminent domain 
authority for interstate natural gas pipelines.226 This federal process 
has resulted in more certainty of investment for natural gas pipelines, 
allowing them to be permitted and built often within a year or two of 
when first proposed. Notably, the lack of alternative means of 
transporting natural gas apart from pipelines may well have led to the 
push for federal siting and eminent domain for interstate lines. With 
pipelines the only means of economically transporting natural gas, 
state interference with siting those pipelines was an insurmountable 
obstacle to transporting the energy resource itself. 
The electric grid now appears to be faced with a similar dilemma 
approximately seventy years later. Because coal, natural gas, and 
uranium can be transported by truck, train, and pipeline, utilities have 
historically been able to use those methods of transportation to bring 
traditional energy resources to power plants built close to load centers, 
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and then build shorter transmission lines to connect power plants to 
customers. Likewise, to the extent utilities in different states wished to 
join RTOs or ISOs to share resources and create regional grids, they 
could plan and build lines under state law and, if the economics 
favored a new interstate line, resources could be pooled to undertake 
the often decade-long path to build such lines and those costs could be 
passed on to ratepayers under state law. But with efforts to integrate 
more wind and other renewable energy resources into the electric grid, 
state siting laws have increasingly posed a real barrier to transporting 
the energy resource itself. 
Do changes in the electricity realm justify creating a new regulatory 
framework to enhance the interstate transmission network to take 
advantage of abundant wind and solar energy resources? Do the 
environmental, reliability, and energy security benefits of renewable 
energy outweigh the costs as well as the likely opposition of state 
regulators and state residents? Certainly, the history of natural gas 
pipeline regulation shows that Congress is able to move beyond state 
authority in the energy law context when there is a drive to turn what 
has historically been a locally constrained energy resource into a 
national one. Today, natural gas provides a reliable form of energy for 
heating and cooking for U.S. residents and industries throughout the 
country. And now, with new domestic natural gas resources made 
available by hydraulic fracturing technologies, that same interstate 
natural gas pipeline network has served to transport gas to power 
plants across the country for electricity generation purposes, 
displacing coal and the adverse environmental impacts associated with 
coal. But none of that development likely could have happened, or 
happened as rapidly, without the creation at a national level of an 
interstate transportation network able to transform natural gas into a 
national energy resource. 
The United States is facing a similar decision with regard to a 
growing number of policies and priorities designed to promote much 
more widespread use of renewable energy, which requires major 
expansions in the electric grid. The existing electric grid can support 
renewable energy as a local resource, transporting it from one part of 
Texas to another or from North Dakota to Minnesota. Moreover, the 
existence of RECs allows local development of renewable energy to 
“count” for reductions in states that do not have such ample resources 
available.227 But REC markets alone will not be enough to integrate the 
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scale of renewable energy necessary to move that electricity resource 
into a more dominant position nationwide. Thus, the difficulties faced 
by utilities, merchant transmission companies, and others attempting 
to build long distance transmission lines to serve today’s regional grids 
and meet state and federal renewable energy targets and carbon 
reduction mandates highlight the limitations of the existing state-
based siting framework. These renewable electricity resources, 
particularly wind, will remain trapped where they are least needed 
unless there is a new regulatory structure to consider the benefits and 
costs of those lines. 
One option is for Congress to adopt the model that currently exists 
for interstate natural gas pipelines. Under the Natural Gas Act, a 
natural gas pipeline operator obtains a Certificate of Public 
Convenience and Necessity from FERC, which in turn allows the 
operator to exercise nationwide eminent domain authority along the 
path of the pipeline if it is not able to enter into voluntary easements 
with all the landowners.228 This would eliminate many of the 
roadblocks to the interstate transmission lines needed to bring wind 
and solar energy from resource-rich parts of the countries to 
population centers. Indeed, as early as 1994, Professor Richard Pierce 
noted that without federal siting authority, the interstate electric 
transmission grid could never obtain the level of cost control and 
reliability enjoyed by the interstate natural gas pipeline system.229 This 
has become even more true twenty years later, in 2015, as the United 
States attempts to integrate increasing amounts of renewable energy 
into the grid that can be generated cheaply in the Midwest (wind) and 
Southwest (solar) but must be transported to population centers 
where both demand and electricity prices are high to be cost-effective. 
Adopting a federal siting and eminent domain framework would 
eliminate the need to obtain multiple state approvals for interstate 
transmission lines and allow FERC to consider national and regional 
benefits of grid expansion. Similar to regulation under the Natural Gas 
Act, states and other interested parties could have significant 
involvement in the permitting process but ultimately it would be 
FERC that would have decision-making authority. This would allow 
the entire nation to have regulatory authority, renewable resources, 
and population centers all within a single jurisdiction — a situation 
that exists today only in the state of Texas and cannot be replicated 
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elsewhere under the current legal framework for interstate 
transmission lines.230 
But while there is historical precedent in the natural gas industry for 
completely replacing state siting authority with federal siting 
authority, there are also good arguments that a fully centralized 
approach may not be the best model for modernizing today’s electric 
grid. First, the Natural Gas Act came on the heels of significant New 
Deal legislation, including the National Labor Relations Act of 1935, 
the Social Security Act of 1935 and the establishment of the Securities 
and Exchange Commission in 1934.231 At that time, the political 
climate favored significant new federal regulation of markets and 
monopolies by Congress and by new federal agencies Congress 
created.232 The Natural Gas Act was an effort to apply these principles 
to natural gas markets and transportation as states struggled to 
regulate interstate pipeline companies and the rates they charged.233 
The Natural Gas Act filled that gap by providing federal regulation of 
interstate pipeline companies, rates, and the infrastructure needed to 
create a federal natural gas pipeline transportation system. Clearly, the 
political climate is quite different today. 
Even putting aside the difference in the political climate between 
1938 and 2015, there are other reasons that the “fix” for expanding 
interstate natural gas pipelines in 1938 may not be ideal for expanding 
interstate electric transmission lines in 2015. In 1938, there were no 
regional entities with any authority or expertise associated with 
natural gas rates, markets, or interstate pipelines. Thus, the only 
potential replacement for state regulation, which was seen as 
inadequate, was the federal government. In 2015, the situation is quite 
different with regard to electricity markets, rates, and interstate 
transmission lines. RTOs and ISOs provide significant authority and 
expertise in connection with setting wholesale electricity rates, 
planning for new transmission lines, and acting as a forum where 
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multiple stakeholders, including regulated entities, consumer 
interests, and states can collaborate on these issues. Even where RTOs 
and ISOs do not exist, regional transmission line planning among 
utilities is well-developed, and entities like the WAPA and the 
Western Electricity Coordinating Council (“WECC”) serve as 
umbrella organizations for many sub-regional planning efforts within 
the Western Interconnection.234 These regional planning efforts will 
become even more robust in future years as a result of FERC Order 
1000, issued in 2011, which mandates that all utilities engage in 
regional planning efforts regardless of whether they are part of a RTO 
or ISO.235 Thus, there is an existing level of expertise and regulatory 
authority at the regional level with regards to the electric industry that 
simply did not exist in 1938 in the natural gas industry. 
Finally, a completely federal approach to interstate transmission line 
siting may not sufficiently take into account local conditions and 
concerns.236 As Professor Ashira Ostrow has aptly summarized: 
The unpredictability of infrastructure needs, combined with 
the permanence of infrastructure improvements, means that 
regulators will make the wrong choice, at least in some cases, 
and that the impact of those choices will constrain energy 
policy for decades to come. Eliminating the states and 
centralizing authority in a federal agency magnifies that risk 
fifty times over. 
Moreover, federal regulation may, at times, be insufficiently 
sensitive to local concerns and conditions. Particularly with 
regard to infrastructure siting, state and local regulators, who 
are a part of and politically accountable to the local 
community, are more likely to be familiar with local 
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conditions and responsive to local preferences than are federal 
administrators.237 
As a result of these concerns, policymakers should seriously 
consider a regional approach to transmission line siting. This idea is 
not completely new. Justice Felix Frankfurter and Professor James 
Landis suggested a regional approach to electricity regulation as far 
back as 1925 in a Yale Law Journal article.238 Even at that early date, 
they recognized “[t]he regional characteristic of electric power, as a 
social and engineering fact, must find a counterpart in the effort of law 
to deal with it.”239 Since that time, the regional growth of the electric 
grid has resulted in the rise of RTOs, regional approaches to 
transmission planning, and the creation of regional electricity markets. 
But so far these regional structures have had no impact on regulatory 
authority over transmission siting. Nevertheless, in the area of 
transmission siting, policymakers should consider regional options in 
addition to either the status quo or a complete transfer of siting 
authority to FERC under the interstate natural gas pipeline model. 
The Subparts below discuss the various regional options. 
A. Interstate Compacts Under EPAct 2005 to Create Regional Siting 
Authorities 
There is the potential under existing federal law to create new, 
regional entities to site interstate transmission lines. As discussed 
earlier, EPAct 2005 has not succeeded to date in granting DOE and 
FERC sufficient backstop authority to site interstate transmission lines 
in NIETCs.240 But a separate provision of the legislation allows three 
or more contiguous states to enter into interstate compacts to establish 
regional siting authorities to determine the need for future 
transmission facilities within those states and carry out the 
transmission siting responsibilities of those states.241 Under the 
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statute, the siting authority would have power to “review, certify, and 
permit siting of transmission facilities,” including facilities in 
NIETCs.242 To date, no states have entered into such compacts and 
there is currently no real incentive for them to do so. But what if 
Congress gave states the option of entering into such compacts and, if 
they refused to do so within a set time period, siting authority would 
transfer to FERC? This would give states a choice to cede authority to 
a regional entity that would be more focused on local concerns or give 
up siting authority altogether. Congress could also use as an 
alternative incentive additional funds for transmission grid-related 
projects for those states that enter into compacts and create regional 
siting authorities. Thus, through new legislation, Congress could 
encourage rather than force states to move to a regional siting model. 
Notably, the Council of State Governments through its National 
Center for Interstate Compacts (“NCIC”) has created online resources 
for states, including model transmission line compact language, in an 
effort to encourage states to create interstate compacts.243 In the model 
compact, the NCIC states one of the “purposes” of the compact is to 
recognize that “states have a vested interest in retaining their 
sovereignty and that EPACT 2005 authorizes interstate compacts that 
can forestall federal preemptive acts if states cooperatively develop a 
transmission siting process.”244 The model compact would create: (1) 
“A state project review panel within each member state, consisting of 
three or more members, to coordinate the views of different agencies 
and interests within the state;” (2) “[a] combined multi-state siting 
authority, consisting of the states affected by a particular project 
proposal, authorized to make siting decisions for that project;” and (3) 
“[a]n Interstate Compact Commission, which provides administrative 
support and rulemaking capability.”245 
It is clear that at the time the NCIC created its model compact, there 
were hopes that state concerns regarding exercise of federal backstop 
siting authority under EPAct 2005 would incentivize states to enter 
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into compacts to avoid an override of state authority.246 But since the 
courts have not supported DOE and FERC’s efforts in that area,247 
there is currently no real incentive for states to cede any power to a 
multi-state siting authority. Moreover, there is a dearth of successful 
regional governance regimes in the United States in light of the 
historic dominance of federal-state-local approaches to regulation in 
most areas of the law.248 Nevertheless, that could change if: (1) 
Congress strengthened federal siting authority beyond what currently 
exists in EPAct 2005; or (2) a group of states determined that their 
renewable energy resources were sufficiently valuable for export as a 
result of new state or federal clean energy policies or financial 
incentives that it would justify entering into a compact to streamline 
siting authority for the necessary transmission lines to export those 
energy resources. In this way, either fear of federal preemption or 
market factors could create the necessary incentives for interstate 
transmission line siting compacts and allow use of the existing 
interstate compact authority in EPAct 2005.249 
B. RTO Siting Authority 
A second option is for Congress to grant transmission line siting 
authority to RTOs within their footprints. Since the start of the 
twenty-first century, RTOs and ISOs have played a central role in 
regional transmission planning and electricity markets in many parts 
of the country.250 FERC and the federal courts have supported those 
efforts, with FERC Order 1000 and the 2013 Illinois Commerce 
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Commission decision serving as just two examples of that support. 
Notably, RTOs and ISOs, where they exist, have a history of creating a 
forum for a diverse number of stakeholders, including state PUCs, 
utilities, consumer advocates, non-utility electricity providers, and 
local governments.251 Thus, RTO-led transmission line siting has the 
potential for creating an open and inclusive forum for resolving multi-
state and multi-party siting issues. 
With the exception of Texas, which has major population centers, 
ample renewable energy resources, and its own electric grid within the 
boundaries of one state, RTOs are the only existing legal entity other 
than the federal government with jurisdiction over a transmission 
grid, major population centers, and ample renewable energy resources. 
No single state other than Texas can bring all of these elements 
together under one umbrella, which suggests a regional approach for 
the remainder of the country.252 To accomplish this goal, Congress 
would need to expressly grant authority to RTOs to site transmission 
lines or states would need to cede some of their authority to the RTO 
through an interstate compact or some other legal means.253 
One potential obstacle to this approach is that RTOs are non-
governmental organizations, and thus do not easily “fit” within the 
types of entities that generally engage in the rulemaking and 
adjudicative functions normally exercised by a governmental body. 
Indeed, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed a similar issue in 2015 in a 
case involving whether Congress unconstitutionally delegated 
regulatory authority to a private corporation when it authorized 
Amtrak and the Federal Railroad Authority to jointly develop 
standards that would govern Amtrak as well as other rail carriers in 
the Passenger Railroad Investment and Improvement Act of 2008. The 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that the delegation was 
unconstitutional because Amtrak was a private corporation, but the 
U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that Amtrak was in fact a 
governmental entity.254 In many ways, however, granting siting 
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authority to RTOs differs from the issue in the Amtrak case because 
RTOs do not own or operate transmission lines and thus would not be 
making decisions that impact their own interests directly, even if an 
RTO may indirectly benefit from a new line because it would ease 
congestion on a grid that it manages. 
Even apart from these distinctions, there is precedent for allowing a 
hybrid organization like an RTO to exercise such authority in the 
context of the electric grid. NERC, the North American Electric 
Reliability Corporation, is a not-for-profit entity composed of utility 
and other members. It long has served as an umbrella organization 
providing standards to help maintain the reliability of the bulk 
transmission system in the United States.255 In EPAct 2005, after the 
2003 Northeast blackouts, Congress authorized FERC to designate an 
electric reliability organization (“ERO”) to ensure grid reliability and 
also granted FERC oversight authority over the ERO. In 2006, FERC 
designated NERC to be the ERO.256 Today, NERC, working with eight 
regional entities, proposes reliability standards and cyber security 
standards to FERC and has authority — with FERC oversight — to 
impose fines up to $1 million daily and to engage in other 
enforcement actions against utilities and other grid participants for 
failure to comply with those standards. Thus, there is precedent even 
within the electricity realm for a private, nonprofit entity to exercise 
quasi-governmental authority with regards to electric grid 
development and management with federal oversight.257 
Moreover, it is certainly possible to give RTOs siting and eminent 
domain authority for interstate transmission lines without completely 
transferring regulatory authority over transmission lines from the 
states to RTOs. Railroads and public utilities, for instance, have 
eminent domain authority and in some cases siting authority for 
building necessary infrastructure, but regulatory authority and 
oversight of those industries continues to remain with state and 
federal governmental entities.258 Thus, Congress could create very 
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limited authority within RTOs to site transmission lines without 
ceding additional authority to regulate those lines, thus avoiding some 
of the unconstitutional delegation problems raised in the Amtrak case. 
C. New Mandates on the States to Consider Regional Need 
A final and more modest option is to leave siting and eminent 
domain authority with the states but require states to affirmatively 
consider regional benefits in making siting and eminent domain 
determinations. Thus, in any siting or eminent domain proceeding for 
an interstate transmission line, federal law would require state PUCs 
and state courts to consider regional “need” and regional “public use” 
rather than in-state need and public use under existing state laws. If 
Congress followed this path, it could use as a model the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996 (“TCA”).259 Congress enacted the 
TCA to increase competition in the telecommunications industry and 
expand wireless service nationwide.260 At the time, local zoning boards 
and city councils across the country were denying and delaying 
approval of cell phone towers in response to local citizen concerns. In 
response, instead of transferring siting authority away from local 
governments to a federal authority, Congress used the siting 
provisions of the TCA to: (1) prevent local governments from banning 
facilities outright; (2) ban unreasonable discrimination among 
providers; (3) require local authorities to respond to siting requests 
within a reasonable time period and to make decisions in writing, 
supported by substantial evidence; and (4) grant parties denied a 
siting permit the right to sue the local government in federal court 
with the claim decided on an expedited basis.261 States and local 
governments retain the right to make decision on where, how, and 
when to site facilities within these federal mandates. According to 
Professor Ashira Ostrow, the law has resulted in the siting of 
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thousands of new cell phone towers and significantly expanded the 
development of a “national telecommunications network.”262 She 
describes this siting policy as a “hybrid federal-local framework” that 
balances national and local land use priorities and has encouraged 
local regulators to cooperate with land use developers.263 
If Congress were to take a similar approach with regard to interstate 
transmission lines, it could leave siting authority with the state but 
require state PUCs and courts to expressly consider regional need and 
regional public use in making certificate of need and eminent domain 
decisions for interstate transmission lines. State actors would be 
required to document this consideration in their decisions, and 
transmission line operators could seek relief in federal court for 
violation of these requirements. This hybrid approach would impose 
new, regional considerations on state actors, thus requiring them to 
take into account the regional value of transmission lines for 
renewable energy integration and grid reliability.264 
All of the options above recognize the regional nature of the modern 
transmission grid as well as the shortcomings of leaving siting and 
eminent domain authority completely with the states under existing 
state laws. In suggesting a regional approach to interstate transmission 
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need in making transmission line siting decisions raises constitutional concerns 
associated with the “anti-commandeering” principles in the Tenth Amendment to the 
U.S. Constitution. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 162 (1992) 
(“The Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or administer a federal 
regulatory program.”); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 932-33 (1997) (same). 
One judge on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in 2000 found that the 
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unconstitutional based on this reasoning. See Petersburg Cellular P’ship v. Bd. of 
Supervisors, 205 F.3d 688, 692 (4th Cir. 2000) (Niemeyer, J., concurring). However, 
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has adopted its reasoning. See, e.g., id. at 691-92. Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has held that Congress may constitutionally require state PUCs to “consider” federal 
standards in state electricity ratemaking proceedings to encourage certain 
cogeneration and small power facilities and to require states to enact rules to carry out 
such federal policies. See FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 759-71 (1982) 
(upholding provisions of PURPA that direct state PUCs to “consider” the adoption 
and implementation of specific rate design regulatory standards and that require states 
to implement such rules). Thus, Supreme Court precedent would appear to support 
Congressional action requiring states to consider regional need among other factors in 
making electric transmission line siting decisions. 
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line siting, this Article recognizes that state interests in protecting 
their own regulatory authority, as well as the politics of today’s 
Congress, make it difficult to envision implementing such an 
approach in the near future. Nevertheless, a major regional or national 
disruption, like the natural gas shortages on the East Coast in the 
1940s, or the 2003 blackouts, which led to the creation of NERC, can 
change political sentiment very quickly. When that day arrives, it will 
be important to consider a regional approach to interstate 
transmission line siting that matches today’s regional grid and regional 
electricity resources in additional to a federal approach or the status 
quo. Indeed, what may seem like a radical approach today may appear 
inevitable in the future. 
Finally, this Article’s support for a shift in siting authority to 
facilitate the development of new interstate transmission lines comes 
with a major caveat — it assumes that the nation will remain 
dependent at least to some extent on today’s existing technology for 
transporting renewable energy for many decades. It may be that there 
will be significant developments in battery storage technology or some 
other means of storing electric energy that will allow the transport of 
wind, solar, and other renewable energy without the need for long-
distance transmission lines.265 There may also be breakthroughs in 
distributed solar technologies or geothermal energy that will make all 
of our current assumptions about how to best transport power 
obsolete. This is important not only for the massive costs associated 
with expanding the electric grid but also because of the adverse 
environmental and aesthetic concerns often associated with large-scale 
transmission lines.266 Nevertheless, this Article assumes that for now, 
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long-distance transmission will remain a central component of the 
U.S. electricity delivery system. As a result, because the grid is so 
central to our lives, and the benefits that come with modernizing the 
grid and integrating renewable energy are so significant, this Article 
concludes that it is critical to address regulatory barriers to a better 
transmission grid using current technological assumptions. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article first compares the history of the development of the 
electric grid with the development of the natural gas pipeline network as 
well as the regulatory history of each form of energy transportation. This 
history helps explain why Congress transferred regulatory authority over 
siting interstate natural gas pipelines from the states to the federal 
government. With regard to natural gas, there was a moment in time in 
the 1940s when the entire country was dependent on a locally 
constrained energy resource and states were blocking the creation of the 
interstate infrastructure necessary to transport that resource to 
population centers around the country. With regard to electricity, we 
have not yet experienced that “moment in time” because renewable 
energy still makes up a small percentage of our total electricity 
generation. But it is growing in many parts of the country, and current 
policies such as state RPSs, the EPA’s Clean Power Plan Proposed Rule, 
and other EPA environmental regulations that have already begun to 
limit the nation’s use of coal-fired electricity will put pressure on utilities 
to transport greater amounts of renewable energy to their customers. 
This Article then concludes that in order to create a modern electric 
grid that can support such a shift, Congress can certainly turn to FERC 
as it did for interstate natural gas pipelines. But a regional siting 
approach better matches the physical aspects of the grid, as well as 
existing electricity markets and energy resources, all of which are or are 
becoming regional in scope, and leaves siting authority closer to the 
communities that the transmission lines will impact. Because of the 
grid’s regional development as well as the rise of unique, regional 
actors like RTOs, Congress through legislation or the states through 
interstate compacts should seriously consider creating a regional 
approach to siting interstate transmission lines. 
 
opposition to transmission lines as compared to recent environmental group support 
in some instances for lines designed to transport renewable energy). Another problem 
with any major build-out of the transmission grid is that it may facilitate transmission 
of new fossil fuel energy resources in addition to or instead of renewable energy 
sources. See Rossi, supra note 1, at 1042-43. 
